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Institutional and Socio-Cultural Factors Explaining the Development of Mutual 
Funds. A Cross-country Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
The development of the mutual fund industry in the United States and Western Europe has been 
one of the conspicuous processes on the international financial markets during the last two 
decades. Mutual funds have mirrored the growth of capital markets proving an excellent vehicle 
for the capitalization of investment opportunities and the dispersion of risk for lay investors. At 
the same time with the unprecedented development of the sector in the West, various mutual 
fund industries in Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific have tried to emulate the successful 
model of the leading national industries.  
While several of the countries of in Europe managed to keep up with the global trends in 
the industry, most of the member states of the European Union are still not able to replicate the 
successes of the leaders of the mutual fund sector. As a consequence, the European Commission 
has embarked on a massive regulatory reform with the aims of harmonizing the legal framework 
in the field of securities, to create a common capital market in the European Union, and to 
stimulate the development of mutual funds across Europe. The later goal is to be achieved both 
through the distribution of fund shares across all EU member states (based on a common 
passport) and through the cross border investment in listed securities.  
The development of mutual funds is pursued by national authorities as it facilitated 
several general economic goals in the United States and the other countries where it reached a 
notable level. Mutual funds facilitated the participation of a large section of the population, those 
that do not possess the knowledge and risk appetite for financial speculation, to the notable 
growth of the capital markets. They created the premises for the diversification of risk and the 
hedging of financial portfolios. They further proved excellent investment vehicles for the 
institutional investors with a more prudent strategy such as insurance companies and private 
pension systems. The growth of such institutional investors during the last decades of the 
twentieth century constituted itself a factor of development for the mutual fund industry 
providing an important source of investment capital. Last but not least, mutual funds constituted 
an important source of capital channeled towards companies in the real economy through the 
securities markets whose role became more prominent even in countries traditionally dominated 
by the banking system. 
Given their increasing prominence, various authors have tried to identify the factors 
stimulating the growth of mutual fund investments in emerging markets (Kaminsky et al., 2001), 
as well as that of mutual funds industries across the world (Klapper et al., 2004; Khorana et al., 
2005). Such analyses emphasize the role of economic and social development for the growth of 
mutual funds, the impact of investment fund regulations, as well as the effect of the rest of the 
financial system on mutual fund performance. In spite of identifying several key determinants of 
mutual funds development, neither of the previous studies examines the cultural and religious 
factors that might influence the industry. Similarly, no previous analysis has paid attention to the 
role played by the Lamfalussy type regulations for mutual funds in the countries of the European 
Union in spite of the fact that this has been one o the most conspicuous institutional 
developments in the field at the world level. 
 This paper uses a similar methodological toolkit as previous studies but draws on a more 
comprehensive set of variables with a potential impact on mutual fund development and expands 
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to twelve years the period of time over which the development and growth of mutual funds is 
analyzed in a cross-country framework - from 1996 to 2007. It first reevaluates the impact of 
factors used in previous analyses on a longer time frame and tries to find better variables that 
capture the influence of those factors. It further estimates the effect the adoption of a Lamfalussy 
regulatory framework for securities has on the development of mutual funds. Finally, our paper 
examines the influence exerted by socio-cultural factors – trust in people, attitudes towards 
financial satisfaction, the relation between work and money, and the desired role of money and 
material possessions, as well as that of religious affiliation on mutual funds in national settings.  
 
Literature Review: 
The literature on mutual funds analyzes mainly their performance and structure on developed 
capital markets and in countries with good records and data sets such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Many such studies focus on the overhead and management costs of mutual 
funds showing that the lowest levels of costs and best performance relative to the capital market 
are those of index funds (Malkiel, 1995; Bogle, 1999). At the same time, actively managed funds 
and oversized funds, with potential diversification benefits, usually have a significant increase in 
management costs (Elton et al., 1996; Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; James et al., 1999). Fees and 
management costs are closely related to the governance of mutual funds. Thus, while 
independent directors, small boards, or fund maturity all tend to reduce overhead costs (Malhotra 
and McLeod, 1997; Tufano and Sevick, 1997), marketing efforts and aggressive strategies are 
associated with higher costs and entry/exit fees (Chordia, 1996; Sirri and Tufano, 1997). Scale 
also plays a role in determining overall costs as economies of scope are balanced by managerial 
diseconomies (Collins and Mack, 1997; James et al., 1999). 
 A different literature evaluates the emergence and role of mutual funds in facilitating 
privatization in former socialist societies (Tirole, 1991; Pistor and Spicer, 1997; Kogut and 
Spicer, 2002; Köke and Schröder, 2003). Such studies not only underline the importance of 
developed capital markets and sound institutional arrangements for the growth of the mutual 
fund industry, but some of them hint at the inverse relation between funds and markets indicating 
that well managed funds with good governance can have a stimulating effect on capital markets 
as a channel for funding businesses. Exploring further the relation between institutional reforms 
and growth, other studies analyze the performance of Western mutual funds investing on 
emerging markets (Kaminsky et al., 2001) or try to determine the factors that explain the 
differential development of the mutual fund industry around the world (Klapper et al., 2004; 
Khorana et al., 2005). In spite of highlighting the importance of general economic and 
institutional arrangements as well as that of particular organizational structures for the 
development of mutual funds, studies as those reviewed above do not generally account for 
socio-cultural factors that may play a role in the growth of the industry. Nor do they have the 
chance to examine the effects recent institutional developments, at the national or international 
level, such as the adoption of a common regulatory framework for securities and mutual funds 
have on the industry. Furthermore, while the quality of regulations pertaining to mutual funds 
themselves is taken into account, the indicators used so far say little about the general regulatory 
quality affecting the overall financial system or about the enforcement of regulations and its 
impact on investor behavior.  
Our research is also indebted to comparative studies in corporate finance and 
development economics. Such studies emphasize the role of securities in financing economic 
growth (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Baker et al., 2005), draw attention to the progressive 
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“securitization” of European national financial systems (Deeg, 1999) and on the effects of the 
European monetary integration on capital markets (Ferrariniet al., 2002). They generally draw 
attention to the increasing role of capital markets even in countries where the banking system has 
been historically responsible for funding businesses. Recently, authors like Andenas and 
Avgerinos (2003) shed light on the new forms of political and institutional processes 
underpinnings of financial integration in Europe, while Warren (2003) and Ferran (2004) 
described in detail the complex process of regulation implied by a common European market in 
financial securities. Scholars concerned by this historical process go beyond a statist paradigm 
situating the optimal forms of corporate governance in the financial sector in between regulation 
by state authorities (Majone, 1996; Bermann and Pistor, 2004) and arrangements emphasizing 
corporate initiative and self-regulation (Mantysaari, 2005; Ali and Gregoriou, 2006). Most such 
works focus on the broader institutional design of capital market integration and on Western 
European examples, neglecting the specifics of these pan-European processes the new members 
of the EU, in the area of mutual funds or with regards to the socio-cultural underpinnings of 
mutual fund performance. Distinctively, we generate our hypotheses from on a study based on 
qualitative methods and further reports from former socialist countries where mutual funds have 
been initiated recently. We pay attention both to socio-cultural factors and to the effects of the 
Lamfalussy regulatory framework adopted by all the EU member states. 
 The multifaceted relation between corporate governance, financial stability and growth 
has become almost commonsensical in development economics (OECD 2004a, 2004b, 2006). 
The legal view of the firm as a set of contracts emphasizing the role of clear property rights 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b) is the one 
to which our research is heavily indebted. While some authors working in this paradigm 
emphasize the flexibility of legal systems promoting good corporate governance (Becket al., 
2004; Beck et al., 2005) others argue that all types of legal systems can facilitate the attainment 
of good governance which is an essential condition for growth (Beck et al., 2000; Levine, 2002; 
Schmukler, 2004; Stulz, 2004). More diverse literatures bring to light the connections between 
political processes and effective governance arrangements (Chui et al., 2000; Keefer, 2004), the 
importance of the later in attracting foreign direct investments (Pajuste, 2005) or in promoting 
international financial integration (Dollar et al., 2004). Many of these studies are broadly 
comparative and theoretically minded. Although they identify key relations between institutions, 
governance and growth, they are seldom able to explain how such connections operate in 
practice, in specific contexts where decisions are made by investors.  
More empirically minded studies try to operationalize previous theoretical categories, to 
define various indicators of the quality of corporate governance which are subsequently 
measured statistically (Berglöf, 2005; Love et al., 2005; Dragota, 2006; Dragota et al., 2006). 
Based on the creation and measurement of legal-institutional indices, scholars of finance and 
economics assess the quality of minority shareholders’ rights as proxies for corporate governance 
quality (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000; Pajuste, 2002; Klapper et al., 2006), as well as the impact of 
minority shareholdes’ protection on capital market development (Modigliani and Perotti, 1997; 
Pagano and Volpin, 2006) and the value of companies (Yarrow, 1985; La Porta et al., 2002; 
Buysschaert et al., 2003). Directly relevant to this research are studies using governance indexes 
to explain the development of capital markets in former socialist countries (Pistor et al., 2000; 
Pajuste, 2005; Dragotă, 2006; Dragotă et al., 2007; Ciobanu et al., 2007) or the failure of some 
CEE countries to build capital markets with growing importance in the economy (Markiewicz, 
2007). Such studies focus mainly on legal provisions concerning the rights of investors in traded 
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companies and commensurate the impact of corporate governance on capital markets understood 
mainly as stock markets. They generally neglect the governance problems of financial 
intermediaries and their role in channeling the savings of many into investment capital financing 
public companies. Our study focuses precisely on the key role of the mutual fund industry, the 
governance challenges posed by such sophisticate intermediaries, and the mixed contribution of 
institutional, socio-cultural and economic development related factors to the growth of mutual 
funds in a broadly comparative setting.  
 
Conclusions of Qualitative Research. Questions to be Addressed in a Comparative Setting 
The previous literature identifies and tests the influence of various economic, political, social and 
regulatory factors on the development of mutual funds around the world. Most directly relevant 
to this research, Khorana et al. (2005) consider factors related to the economic development of 
the countries under survey, to the institutional structure of the mutual fund industry itself, to the 
competition or stimulus provided by the rest of the financial system of to the social 
characteristics of the population of each country that constitute the basis of the demand for 
mutual fund shares.  Economic development is characterized by GDP and per capita GDP, 
measures of wealth and financial openness, as well as indicators about real interest rates and 
inflation. The factors characterizing the mutual fund industry refer to laws, regulations, and 
taxation, that is, to the regulations pertaining to mutual funds and the cost of compliance with 
them, to the taxation of funds, the age of the industry and the costs of starting up a fund. Other 
components of the financial system, and especially so the banking system, can be an alternative 
to mutual funds as they compete for the same investment capitals. Therefore, the authors analyze 
the effect banking system development, banking concentration or the role of deposit insurance 
schemes in stimulating investor confidence. Finally, a number of indicators of social 
development, closely related and statistically correlated with those of economic development, are 
used as factors to explain the development of mutual fund industries: personal wealth, general 
level of education, newspaper circulation and the number of internet users in the country are all 
factors in the regressions performed in the article. 
  Klapper et al. (2004) use similar indicators for broadly the same type of factors to 
explain the different performance of mutual funds in a panel data setting. The use a more 
restrictive number of indicators among which GDP per capita, deviation and average of stock 
market return, stock market capitalization over GDP, stock market value traded ratio, bond 
market capitalization and dummies for financial crises and the type of financial system. Added to 
the above, the authors include a number of variables about the quality of the legal system, the 
political risk in each country and about voice and accountability as proxy for the quality of 
governance in each country. While the previous articles outline important factors contributing 
significantly to the growth of the mutual fund industry several others are not addressed or are 
treated only partially. Thus, while Khorana et al. (2005) include various measures of the quality 
of mutual fund regulations, they pay less attention to the regulations affecting the entire 
economic and financial system.  
Although the indicators they use are more directly connected to the activity of mutual 
funds, one can expect that the multitude of lay investors are only vaguely aware of the specifics 
of fund regulations their behavior being more directly affected by the clarity and effectiveness of 
general regulations pertaining to financial and economic life. At the same time, one wonders 
whether the “Voice and Accountability” indicator developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) in 
“Governance Matters” is the most appropriate one to measure overall regulatory quality. 
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Furthermore, indictors of social and cultural values or trust are not considered by the above 
authors although they seem to appear often in the literature on the varieties of capitalism (Verdey, 
1995b; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Maurer, 2006). We formulate similar hypotheses about 
the factors expected to determine mutual fund development and growth but expand the range of 
factors considered based on the results of an ethnographic study and the review of the literature 
on varieties of capitalism in sociology and anthropology. Thus, we estimate the effect of the 
enforcement of regulations, the influence of socio-cultural factors for underlining financial 
practices, and the importance of a Lamfalussy type regulatory framework for developed mutual 
funds industries. 
 The importance of trust and cultural values is underlined by the ethnographic and 
qualitative studies of financial practices in developing and emerging markets. Sociological 
analyses of forms of capitalism met in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia (Verdery, 1995a, 1995b; 
Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999, 2001; Mandel and Humphrey, 2002; Maurer, 2006) indicate that 
trust and religious values come repeatedly in interviews and surveys of lay investors. So does the 
uneasy relation between work and money suggesting that the adoption of capitalist practices is 
made possible by the diminishing importance of work as the only legitimate source of money 
and gain (Verdery, 1995b; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Dunn, 2004). Similarly, a recent 
ethnographic study of the mutual fund industry in Romania conducted by the authors of this 
paper shows that trust, the quality of the judiciary and the enforcement of regulations are among 
the most important factors with impact on the growth of investment funds. Below is a list of 
factors and actors that mentioned them during a focus group organized with that occasion.  
 
Table 1: Factors affecting the development of the mutual fund industry in Romania: weaknesses of the legal 
environment, enforcement of regulations, corporate governance practices, and public policies regarding the capital 
market in Romania. Results of a focus group organized in July 2008 in Bucharest. “X” indicates that actors in 
column header mentioned the factors as influencing mutual fund development while “O” means that the actors in 
column header did not mention or disagreed that factors mentioned at the beginning of the row have any importance. 
 
Factor of mutual 
fund development Retail Investors Asset Managers 
Regulators and 
Politicians 
Financial Analysts 
and Journalists 
Legislative process 
concerning the capital 
market 
X X O X 
Quality of laws and 
regulations for mutual 
funds 
X X X X 
Public consultations 
for the adoption of 
laws 
X X O X 
Enforcement of mutual 
fund regulations X O O X 
Cost of complying 
with regulations O X O X 
Activity of civil 
society O X X X 
The quality of the 
judiciary X O O X 
Statute and 
organization of 
securities regulator 
X X O X 
Transposition of 
European Union 
regulations 
X X O X 
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Governance of 
investment funds X X X X 
Trust in mutual funds 
and securities market 
institutions 
X O O X 
Trust in people and 
society X X X X 
Protection of retail 
investors X O O X 
 
We perform several multivariate regressions in order to evaluate the influence of the factrs 
considered.2 Concretely, we test for the significance of a diversity of indicators regarding the 
quality of regulations but we emphasize the indicators of “Government Effectiveness” and 
“Regulatory Quality” form “Governance Matters VII”. The advantage of the two indicators is 
that they capture both the quality and enforcement of regulations and are standardized measures 
of institutional quality with data available for all countries in the survey for each of the years 
analyzed in our study. We further include a dummy variable indicating the existence of 
Lamfalussy type regulations (the EU regulatory framework for securities and mutual funds) in 
the countries under survey trying to capture the influence exerted by the EU common market for 
mutual funds on the development of the local industry. Finally, we draw on data form the World 
Values Survey to include indicators about trust in society, attitude about money, the relation 
between work and money, and the religious affiliation of our subjects in the multivariate 
regressions trying to explain the differential development or growth rates of the mutual fund 
industry in countries included in the analysis.  
 
Competing Institutional Frameworks for Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds (a.k.a., open-end funds) are basically collective investment entities in which 
investors buy shares. In theory, they have several advantages over alternative investment 
vehicles and especially over risk funds (a.k.a, closed-end funds): 1. they allow people to pool 
resources and make more efficient and less risky investments with the help of professional 
administrators; 2. they allow the purchasing and redeeming of shares (i.e., entry and exit) on an 
ongoing basis. Administrators are supposed to implement the investments strategies and to 
calculate and declare publicly the current values of the shares. Money and other financial assets 
of the funds are kept by depositary banks which also keep a separate record certifying or not the 
public values of the shares declared by administrators. Regulators supervise the activity of 
administrators and depositaries and issues new regulations regarding the activity of these funds. 
Mutual funds are in sharp contrast with closed-end varieties of funds characterized by stricter 
entry/exit rules, higher risk profiles, and more sophisticated investors.   
Whereas in most of the Western countries mutual funds would be considered relatively 
safe financial ventures with a passive portfolio administration strategy, closed-end funds can 
adopt a variety of forms and investment strategies satisfying the appetite for risk of sophisticate 
investors. The later are investment companies issuing non-redeemable shares that implement 
specialized investment strategies and more aggressive management programs. The responsibility 
for the results is assumed by the asset managers and the participation of investors to decision 
making is more limited than in the case of mutual funds. 
Both types of investment funds have a long history in the United States. While closed-
end funds were created at the end of the nineteenth century, the first mutual funds appeared in 
                                               
2
 A detailed list of variables and sources of data is presented in Annex 1 at the end of this paper. 
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1924. The Investment Company Act of 1940 provided the first rigorous classification of the 
investment funds and regulated the activity of investment companies. While mutual funds had a 
modest development up until the 1980s, they grew spectacularly during the 1990s and after. 
Some of the factors considered responsible for the development are the tight regulations with 
regards to the interest rates banks could pay on deposits, the increasing spreads practiced by 
commercial banks, the development of the life insurance industry and of the private pension 
schemes that provided unprecedented investment capitals, as well as the spectacular development 
of the stock exchange in the United States and other countries at the end of the twentieth century. 
A functional separation of investment funds similar to that in the United States is 
implemented in most other parts of the world. In the European Union, the largest market for 
mutual funds after the United States, mutual funds are formally classified as UCITS 
(undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities). The EU has embarked on a 
massive regulatory effort in the field of securities for the last 10 years trying to emulate the 
growth of capital markets and investment vehicles in the United States. The key role in the 
adoption of new laws in the EU member states has been played by the Council of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) and its measures towards more integrated capital markets in 
Europe.3 CESR is a consultative committee set up to help the EC in its initiative to harmonize 
and integrate European capital markets with the aim of facilitating cross border investments and 
financial capital mobility in Europe.4 Its goals are not only to make national governments adopt 
harmonized regulations and to stimulate better cooperation among national securities regulators, 
but also to promote new modalities for policy making and the adoption of regulatory measures 
regarding the capital markets.5 
The regulatory framework instituted by CESR in all member states of the European 
Union is meant to create the premises for the selling of mutual fund shares across national 
borders. It is simultaneously supposed to facilitate cross border investments by mutual fund 
managers in assets traded on European securities markets. Basically meant to create the 
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 The ensemble of institutions and policies centered on CESR is also known at the European Union level as the 
Lamfalussy process. 
4
 CESR is the concrete result of a series of action plans and policies outlined in the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) initiated by the European Commission in 1999 and made an integral part of the “Lisbon Agenda” by the 
European Council in Lisbon in April 2000. FSAP’s aim was to further the creation of a single market in financial 
services within the EU; it also identified the need of pan-European reforms in securities markets regulations that 
could be addressed by the adoption of new laws, by the implementation of new law-making policies, and by paying 
attention to the mechanisms of market supervision. See Committee of Wise Men (2001), Final Report on the 
Regulation of European Securities Markets, available at www.cesr-eu.org . 
5
 A Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of Security Markets chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy was 
mandated by the ECOFIN of July 17, 2000 to produce a more accurate diagnosis of the state of capital market 
regulation across Europe and to suggest more specific policies to further their integration. Apart from a lucid 
evaluation of the weaknesses in European capital markets, the Final Report on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets suggested a systematic set of measures organized according to a four level approach consisting of 
framework principles (level 1), directives and regulations to implement the principles (level 2), enhanced 
cooperation among national securities regulators to implement levels 1 and 2 (level 3), and actions to enforce 
Community law and to strengthen European coordination in securities regulation (level 4). In summary, the 
Lamfalussy process was meant to introduce not only new (harmonized) principles and regulations of securities 
markets but to institutionalize a new process of policy making in the field characterized by broad and transparent 
consultations with, the incorporation of suggestions from, and the strengthened cooperation among all market actors.. 
For a more detailed presentation of the working methods and policies implemented by CESR see “How CESR 
Works within the Lamfalussy Process,” document available at http://www.cesr.eu/index.php?page=institutional 
context&mac=0&id= , and the excellent book by Ellis Ferran (2004). 
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institutional foundations for the free movement of capital in the EU, the regulatory reform is 
supposed to bring benefits at a microeconomic level as well. Thus, it is assumed that cross border 
distribution of shares and cross border investments will offer increased opportunities for hedging 
and portfolio diversification as well as new opportunities for profits. 
The framework imposes a new classification of investment funds into UCITS 
(undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities) referring to institutional 
solutions harmonized at the EU level and non-UCITS type entities where national regulators can 
create specific, non-harmonized types of funds. Elaborating on a previous EU directive6 
regarding investment funds, the new regulations roughly reproduce the former (and current in the 
United States) classification into mutual funds and closed-end funds.7 While non-UCITS and 
closed-end funds are seen as more risky undertakings available for institutional and sophisticate 
investors, UCITS and mutual funds, having to comply with tighter and uniform regulations 
across borders, operating on the principle of freely redeemable shares by investors and imposing 
clear provisions with regard to prospectus and the release of relevant information, are open to the 
general public of lay investors as well as to institutional investors facing prudential regulations 
such as insurance companies and pension funds. The later are the variety supposed to have 
grown consistently around the world with the development of capital markets during the last 
decades.  
The EU officials are optimistic about the creation of a single market for mutual funds in 
Europe and on the stimulating effect the Lamfalussy regulations on the mutual fund industry. 
The examination of the “Lamfalussy League tables” – the reports of the transposition of 
Lamfalussy regulations in all member states, indicates that all directives and recommendations 
regarding mutual funds have been transposed quickly into national legislation. 8 Given the 
current uniformity of regulations with regards to mutual funds in all member states of the 
European Union yet the diverse performance of the local mutual fund industry, questions arise 
regarding the factors explaining their different development in Europe and around the world. Our 
paper analyses the influence of the regulations affecting the entire financial system (less 
analyzed by the existing literature on mutual funds), the different enforcement abilities of 
national governments and the influence of socio-cultural factors in different countries on the 
growth of the mutual fund industry over a period of twelve years.  
 
Methodology Used and the Generation of Hypotheses 
We generated our hypotheses from the he study of previous comparative analyses of mutual fund 
development around the world (Klapper et al., 2004; Khorana et al., 2005) and based on an 
ethnographic study of the mutual fund industry in a former socialist society (see previous 
section). With an industry only 15 years old, Romania is currently integrated into the European 
Union and had to adopt the Lamfalussy type regulations regarding securities a long time before 
its formal accession into the EU in 2007. While the case of Romania can be considered atypical 
in many respects with regards to the countries with a developed mutual fund industry, its utility 
                                               
6
 See Directive 85/611/EEC of the Council (UCITS) on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS). 
7
 For a classification of European types of investment funds see the web site of the European Fund and Asset 
Management Association (EFAMA) at www.efama.org; for the American varieties and their regulation see the 
website of the Investment Company Institute (ICI) at www.ici.org.  
8
 The most important “Lamfalussy” directives adopted by the European Commission through the co-decision 
procedure and after consultation of market actors by CESR are the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse Directive, 
the Transparency Directive, and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). 
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for the generation of research hypotheses comes precisely from its “exoticism”. A former 
socialist society that embarked on the transition to capitalism twenty years ago, Romania tried to 
emulate the capital market institutions of the United States and is now involved in the building of 
a single European market for mutual funds. During the 1990s, it tried to adopt the laws, 
regulations, institutional solutions and technical expertise from the United States in an attempt to 
create a successful domestic mutual fund industry. It is currently doing the same thing in 
emulating the European model for investment funds. However, in spite of the successful “on 
books” transfer of laws, regulations and institutions, the case of Romania has so far proved to be 
a failure in almost all respects regarding the local establishment of mutual funds. The causes of 
this failure are, beyond factors related to general economic development, the age of the industry, 
the effectiveness of government and the quality of regulations (especially with regards to their 
enforcement), as well as the socio-cultural foundations of economic practices that both differ 
profoundly from its most successful peers and are hard to change in a short period of time. 
 We have gathered multi-annual data on a multitude of dependent and explanatory 
variables (see Annex 1 for a list of dependent and explanatory variables) for a sample of 41 
countries that submit reports on the state of the mutual fund industry to the Investment Company 
Institute. We have further computed averages for the series gathered over the period from 1996 
to 2007. For most of the series we have yearly data. For the variables based on the World Values 
Survey (WVS) we have two series of data coming from two waves of the survey for each 
indicator. As WVS data refers to socio-cultural factors with a great stability in time and as the 
waves of the survey are conducted over three to four year windows, we take the two data series 
as sufficient and used their average in our analysis. 
 We take the average data series and do an analysis of pairwise correlations between all 
the variables. We are thus able to identify both variables that determine our dependent variables 
and pairs of highly correlated explanatory variables. O the basis of the above analysis we are 
able to select a more limited set of variables which we use in multivariate regressions. We 
compute regressions using four dependent variables mainly for robustness checks but also 
because some of them provide different information about the development and / or growth of 
the mutual fund industry across the sample of countries in the survey. We report mainly the 
regression models whose coefficients are statistically significant but also include some of the 
models which, in spite of not being rigorously significant, still provide interesting information 
for our analysis. 
  
Data Gathered 
The paper uses aggregate country level data on the net asset values of mutual funds, data about 
the economic performance and the development of the financial sector, indicators about 
institutional performance and the quality of laws and regulations, as well as results of survey on 
various socio-cultural values around the world.  
We have access to data on the net asset values of mutual funds provided by the 
Investment Company Institute (ICI) and the European Fund and Asset Managers Association 
(EFAMA). Finally, due to data consistency considerations as well as to insure the existence of 
time series for all the countries in the survey, we use the data series of total net assets (in million 
US Dollars) made available by the Investment Company Institute. This reduces the sample to 44 
countries from which we further exclude Lichtenstein, because of the lack of data for most of the 
other variables used in our analysis, as well as Luxembourg and Ireland. The later two countries 
have abnormal ratios of net asset values under management by the mutual fund industry to GDP 
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(as well as very high NAV per capita) and have been excluded from the sample for statistical 
analysis.9 We end up with 41 countries from around the world for most which we have gathered 
annual data for all the indicators used in the analysis and assembled from a variety of sources for 
the period between 1996 and 2007. 
The single source for the data series on net asset values (ICI) insures consistency of the 
classification of the industry into mutual funds (of interest to the present analysis) and closed-end 
funds, as well as the similar treatment of funds of funds and of the home and foreign-domiciled 
funds. It also assures comparability as all NAVs are reported in US$. Supplemental data from 
EFAMA and national industries are used to check on the ICI provided data. Given the diversity 
of regulatory frameworks and of the different classification schemes adopted by national industry 
regulators, data consistency provided by a single source overcomes the disadvantages of a 
diminishing number of countries in the survey. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and a selection of explanatory variables. For a more 
detailed description of the variables used in the regressions and of the sources of data see Annex 1: Description of 
Variables. 
 
Variable   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. N 
NAV (million US$) 312,643 42,139 7,296,259 112 1,122,483 42 
NAGDP 0.3049 0.1957 2.6937 0.0014 0.4775 41 
NAPOP 7,379 2,739 79,091 3 14,150 41 
NASMK 0.4923 0.2910 4.5504 0.0068 0.7422 41 
NAGR 0.3180 0.2153 1.4408 0.0557 0.3051 40 
GDP (million US$) 735,972 235,116 9,960,825 17,030 1,689,098 41 
POP (million) 102.02 21.99 1,279.24 1.99 253.98 41 
SMKC 0.7284 0.4705 3.5942 0.0754 0.6694 42 
CPI 6.02 6.09 9.64 2.24 2.33 42 
GEFF 1.04 1.09 2.18 -0.59 0.84 42 
REGQ 0.92 1.02 1.77 -0.61 0.67 42 
RLAW 0.90 1.03 1.99 -0.90 0.87 42 
FSDEP 0.6798 0.5255 2.1714 0.1694 0.4369 40 
LIPV 0.0373 0.0261 0.1288 0.0015 0.0338 42 
NLIPV 0.0246 0.0230 0.0474 0.0040 0.0124 42 
LISTC 840 274 5535 51 1455 21 
PVBDK 0.2848 0.2411 1.1691 0.0008 0.2637 34 
PBBDK 0.3698 0.3381 1.0419 0.0498 0.2247 39 
REMIT 0.0099 0.0048 0.1042 0.0001 0.0171 40 
INTUS 28 26 57 2 17 41 
GDPCAP 15,168.18 12,360.73 38,180.71 502.26 11,726.90 41 
FDIOUT 3.3248 1.4970 21.1250 0.0357 4.5336 41 
OPNGDP 79.50 66.71 314.33 22.40 51.77 41 
RINTR 0.0520 0.0386 0.4604 0.0000 0.0695 42 
INFCPI 0.0577 0.0292 0.4158 -0.0003 0.0824 42 
INDAGE 40 43 83 6 20 40 
NEWSPP 195 166 558 26 145 37 
                                               
9
 Klapper et al. (2004) and Khorana et al. (2005), the two articles using a similar multivariate analysis on a panel of 
countries around the world cited in this paper, also exclude the two outliers (Luxembourg and Ireland) from their 
analysis.  
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PPTRUST 0.3191 0.3053 0.6650 0.0280 0.1600 40 
FRCHOIC 6.84 7.03 7.85 4.70 0.73 40 
FINSAT 5.64 5.83 7.50 3.30 1.01 30 
WKMNY 0.5406 0.5285 0.8780 0.2650 0.1445 32 
FUTMNY 0.5983 0.6350 0.7810 0.3530 0.1092 34 
HDI 0.8693 0.9208 0.9627 0.5234 0.1048 40 
ICRGPRR 77.00 78.17 91.33 48.50 9.71 42 
AVGSCH 8.58 8.915 12.25 2.45 2.19899 42 
MSLM 0.0595 0.0030 0.9890 0.0000 0.2106 42 
OTDX 0.0728 0.0030 0.9770 0.0000 0.2396 42 
PRST 0.2252 0.0350 0.9690 0.0000 0.2972 42 
RCAT 0.4740 0.4445 0.9890 0.0030 0.4021 42 
OTHR 0.1651 0.0455 0.9450 0.0020 0.2616 42 
 
We assemble a comprehensive database of dependent and explanatory variables. Basic 
statistics for the countries in the analysis (population size, GDP, per capita GDP) are taken from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) Database of the World Bank and from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) Database of the International Monetary Fund. Such data is 
used both as explanatory variables and to compute the dependent variables employed in the 
analysis and for robustness checks. 
A group of indicators measuring the relative size of financial flows from and into each 
country (FDI to GDP ratio, Imports and Exports per GDP, Remittances per GDP, etc.) are taken 
from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine’s “A New Database on Financial Development and 
Structure”. Initiated in the 1990s, the database has been updated periodically, including as 
recently as the end of 2008, containing data for all the countries in the survey for every year in 
the analysis.  
We use indicators for the development of securities markets, banking system and overall 
financial system in each of these countries. Competing financial institutions (banks, pension 
funds, insurance schemes) can act both as alternatives to mutual fund investments having a 
negative effect on the development of the industry, and as pools of capital channeled specifically 
through mutual funds by institutional investors thus stimulating the development of the industry. 
We examine the effects of such alternative financial systems on the mutual fund industry. 
Banking system regulations and safety, with ambivalent effects on the growth of mutual 
funds, are described by indicators regarding the existence, type, and coverage of deposit 
insurance schemes. We include a number of such indicators taken from Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2005) in our regressions that offer a more technical description of the “supply side” 
characteristics of the banking industry in the country.  
Dummy variables are used to test for the effect of financial crises on the growth of the 
mutual fund industry and for the role of the Lamfalussy-type regulatory framework in 
stimulating the development of mutual funds in the EU countries as opposed to the rest of the 
sample. The dummy for financial crises is created with data taken from Laeven and Valencia 
(2008), while the Lamfalussy dummy is created with data from the Lamfalussy transposition 
tables published by the European Commission and reports from the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR).    
Various measures of political stability and the quality of the political environment are 
taken from Kaufmann et al.’s “Governance Matters VII” (2008) with data running through 2007 
and from the Political Risk Ratings published by the International Country Risk Guide. The 
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quality of laws and regulations and the perception of corruption are also reflected by indicators 
from Kaufmann et al. (2008) and from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. 
Further data about social development and quality of life indicators is taken from the 
WDI Database of the World Bank as well as from previous studies of development economists 
such as Barro and Lee (2000) or the UNDP World Development Report. 
Finally, a variety of indicators referring broadly to socio-cultural values are taken or 
adapted from the database of the World Values Survey. Such indicators reflect the religious 
beliefs of citizens of the considered countries, attitudes towards money and financial satisfaction, 
the relation between work and money, and the trust in their fellow people. 
 
Description of Data and Summary Statistics 
The examination of the descriptive statistics and average values for the dependent variables 
indicates the ample differences in the levels of development of the mutual fund industry in the 
countries compared, both in absolute and relative terms. Net asset values ranging from 112 
million US$ to 7,296,259 million US$, NAV to GDP ratio ranging from 0.14% to 269% and per 
capita NAV anywhere from 3 US$ to 79,091 US$ indicate a large dispersion in the indicators of 
mutual fund development. The average growth rates of national industries for the period from 
1996 to 2007 also varied greatly with a minimum of 5.57% and a maximum of 144%. At the 
same time, the median growth rate was 21.53% indicating an uneven evolution of the various 
national industries during the analyzed period (see Annex 2 for the NAV figures for the years 
1996 to 2007).  
The outliers are Lichtenstein, Luxembourg (with a NAV to GDP ratio of 4,862.00%), and 
Ireland (with a NAV to GDP ratio of 269.37%), all European countries that host impressive 
mutual fund industries due to the fiscal and regulatory facilities created by the governments. As 
previous studies of mutual fund development show (Klapper et al., 2004; Khorana et al., 2005), 
these values do not come from domestic factors but indicate that a considerably large 
international industry is located there. As a consequence, these countries are eliminated from the 
sample on which multiple regressions are performed. 
At the other end of the spectrum, postsocialist countries like Romania and Russia, or 
Asian countries like Pakistan have the least developed mutual fund industries of those included 
in the analysis. Thus, Romania had an average NAV per capita of 3.45 US$ and an average NAV 
to GDP ratio of about 0.14% during the period. Russia had slightly higher values even if they 
stay small when compared to the rest of the countries: NAV per capita of 10.82 US$ and an 
average NAV to GDP ratio of 0.42% for the period. Coming from a different historical and 
political context, Pakistan displayed similarly low values of these indicators: average per capita 
NAV of 3.45 US$ and average NAV to GDP ratio of 0.57% for the period. At he same time, 
these countries made efforts to stimulate the growth of the industry during the analyzed period. 
Given the low starting point, it comes as no surprise that these are the countries with the highest 
average annual growth rates of the industry in the sample analyzed: Russia – 144.08%, Pakistan - 
129.02%, and Romania – 83.80%.  
The United States leads the rest of the countries in the sample in terms of the NAV of the 
mutual fund industry with an annual average for the period of 7,296,258.67 million US$. It is 
also among the first in the world with regards to the NAV to GDP ratio (71.79%) and of the 
average per capita NAV (24,750.91 US$). Apart from Hong Kong, a regional financial center for 
Asia with high average values for NAV (285,022.17 million US$) and for per capita NAV 
(41,749.88 US$), the rest of the countries with developed mutual fund industries come from 
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North America, Europe and the Pacific.  Thus, Canada had an average NAV of 344,958.08 US$, 
average per capita NAV of 10,907.33 US$ and a NAV to GDP ratio of 44.97%. Of the European 
Countries, the United Kingdom, France, and Spain have the highest figures for the industry. The 
average NAV of UK funds was 432,698.17 million US$, the average per capita NAV was 
7,241.50 US$, while the NAV to GDP ratio was on average 27.91%. France had average NAV 
of 1,019,476.83 US$, average NAV per capital of 16,909.57 US$ and a NAV to GDP ratio of 
73.73%. Similarly, Spain’s average values for the indicators were 244,459.50 million US$ NAV, 
5,855.31 US$ in NAV per capita and 39.46% for the NAV to GDP ratio. Finally, of the Pacific 
societies, Australia stands out with an average NAV of 461,624.27 million US$ for the period, 
an average annual NAV per capita of 461,624.27 US$, and an average NAV to GDP ratio of 
92.04%.  
 
Table 3: Dependent Variables. Average Values for the period 1996-2007 
 
  NAV NAGDP NAPOP NASMK NAGR GDP 
  million US$   US$ per capita     million US$ 
Americas                     
Argentina         4,506.00 0.01507 120.55 0.05552 0.3111 292,055.26 
Brazil         214,294.83 0.30096 1,178.21 0.73688 0.2116 677,212.20 
Canada         344,958.08 0.44970 10,907.33 0.42264 0.1548 741,469.98 
Chile         9,010.75 0.10337 561.37 0.10538 0.2409 81,115.13 
Costa Rica         1,383.25 0.05129 220.31 0.63273 0.1424 17,029.93 
Mexico         39,204.78 0.04692 282.16 0.24477 0.2060 582,523.70 
United States         7,296,258.67 0.71787 24,750.91 0.53141 0.1231 9,960,824.98 
Europe                     
Austria         78,704.08 0.39234 9,665.21 1.81552 0.1264 196,029.88 
Belgium         84,850.50 0.35126 8,211.26 0.45110 0.1728 235,116.40 
Czech Republic         3,437.64 0.04774 308.43 0.20274 0.4202 61,328.32 
Denmark         47,184.58 0.28174 8,749.69 0.46047 0.2533 161,320.02 
Finland         26,818.17 0.19573 5,118.64 0.17202 0.3886 125,463.58 
France         1,019,476.83 0.73730 16,909.57 0.98185 0.1347 1,345,407.20 
Germany         246,676.67 0.12857 3,000.11 0.28151 0.1023 1,898,939.72 
Greece         30,060.25 0.22278 2,738.87 0.45068 0.0906 135,770.30 
Hungary         4,380.82 0.07127 397.58 0.27460 0.3644 51,208.01 
Ireland         327,965.42 2.69371 79,090.85 4.55040 0.6156 104,065.47 
Italy         394,437.58 0.35527 6,816.06 0.83242 0.1574 1,102,856.86 
Liechtenstein         13,619.00       0.5059   
Luxembourg         1,101,455.08 48.62078 2,417,338.60 31.54802 0.2124 21,038.09 
Netherlands         91,459.08 0.23644 5,696.33 0.21193 0.0557 385,427.72 
Norway         26,374.25 0.14519 5,732.96 0.29097 0.2189 173,228.01 
Poland         10,418.33 0.05065 272.77 0.19670 0.5465 178,784.31 
Portugal         23,070.42 0.20500 2,223.96 0.54583 0.0697 111,734.00 
Romania         111.50 0.00143 3.45 0.01363 0.8380 43,157.94 
Russia         1,545.67 0.00422 10.82 0.00676 1.4408 292,448.39 
Slovakia         2,839.40 0.04334 219.55 1.20211 0.4975 22,738.24 
Slovenia   3,351.50 0.02128 278.16 0.31942 0.6985 21,119.74 
Spain         244,459.50 0.39455 5,855.31 0.56845 0.1119 607,782.92 
Sweden         92,165.67 0.35094 10,240.28 0.31653 0.1926 252,607.45 
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Switzerland         94,381.00 0.36621 12,883.14 0.15272 0.1320 252,778.35 
Turkey         16,350.67 0.02505 114.98 0.16899 0.4025 286,497.64 
United Kingdom         432,698.17 0.27915 7,241.50 0.19418 0.1644 1,501,648.75 
Asia and Pacific                     
Australia         461,624.27 0.92039 20,953.40 0.91504  422,202.53 
China   434,063.00 0.01515 27.22 0.13789  1,461,464.24 
Hong Kong         285,022.17 1.44149 41,749.88 0.36765 0.3433 181,250.98 
India         29,997.33 0.04989 26.97 0.10886 0.2722 526,552.32 
Japan         433,446.00 0.09032 3,415.41 0.11696 0.0691 4,770,364.04 
Korea, Rep. of         179,178.40 0.28110 3,456.39 0.50034 0.1084 552,905.65 
New Zealand         9,315.67 0.16890 2,341.88 0.41222 0.0719 54,518.58 
Pakistan    3,560.00 0.00569 3.45 0.08780 1.2902 80,781.05 
Philippines         859.67 0.00683 7.55 0.02403 0.4922 82,195.51 
Taiwan         45,073.00       0.2262   
Africa                     
South Africa 36,017.42 0.23295 761.54 0.12108 0.2616 142,911.15 
 
National mutual fund industries display different patterns with regards to growth over the 
examined period. While the industries of all of the countries under survey grew in terms of NAV 
from 1996 to 2007, the patterns and rhythms of growth differ from region to region. Thus, the 
NAV in the United States and most countries of Western Europe grew continuously even if at 
small average annual rates. Many of the countries of Asia, Latin America and even North 
America display a different growth pattern. Their NAV grow during the 1990s and decline 
sensibly between 2000 and 2002 only to grow again during the last five years of the period under 
survey. They also register slightly higher average growth rates for national industries than the 
most developed countries. At the same time, most of the former socialist societies of Central and 
Eastern Europe have created their mutual fund industries sometime in the second half of the 
1990s and grew continuously since and at relatively high average annual growth rates. Although 
neither of the countries in the later group have so far recorded significant values in terms of total 
NAV of national industries, per capital NAV or NAV to GDP ratios.  
 
Results of Regressions 
Based on the pairwise correlation matrix for all the variables we are able to see both the 
explanatory variables that are highly correlated with our dependent variables and the high 
correlation among certain explanatory variables (see Annex 2 for the pairwise correlation matrix 
of dependent and explanatory variables). On the basis of such information we are able to exclude 
from the analysis variables that do not seem to be correlated with the dependent variables and 
that do not have a significant influence on the indicators of mutual fund development. Of the 
remaining explanatory variables, we select a few that we include in differently specified 
multivariate regression models. We exclude a number of variables from the analysis that are 
highly correlated with our strongest explanatory variables and could induce multicoliniarity into 
our regressions. 
 We use the average annual NAV to GDP ratio as our main dependent variable. We take it 
as the most representative indicator of mutual fund development in spite of the criticism brought 
to it by previous authors. Although it is computed as the ratio of a static indicator with a dynamic 
one, it insures comparability across countries and highlights the importance of mutual funds to 
the funding of economic growth instead of simply indicating a particular structure of the 
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financial system (as in the case of mutual fund NAV to primary securities used by Khorana et al. 
[2005]). We include three more dependent variables in the analysis for robustness checks. We 
use average per capita NAV, average NAV to stock market capitalization ratio, and the average 
annual growth rate of NAV for each of the countries. We generally perform the same 
multivariate regressions as in the case of the primary dependent variable to which we add a small 
number of models each time when that seems to make economic sense or when the pairwise 
correlation analysis suggests a new model specification.  
 The results of the models with NAV to stock market capitalization ratio are usually not 
significant at any of the 1%, 10%, or 15% levels so we do not include them in the list of results 
reported (see Annex3: Multivariate regression results). Models using the average NAV growth 
rate as dependent variable generally have opposed signs to those using average NAV to GDP or 
average per capita NAV. We report them in Annex 3 but give them a different interpretation 
than that for the first two classes of multivariate OLS models. 
 We report results for all specification significant for the first series of multivariate OLS 
models for each of the other two types of model specifications. In addition, we report results for 
models that are significant when per capita NAV and NAV growth rate are used as dependent 
variables. We mark differently models significant under all three specifications of the dependent 
variables, models that are significant under at least one of the specifications and models whose 
coefficients are not significant at any of the levels considered. In addition to that, we report on a 
number of models whose coefficients are not significant but still have the same sign under all 
specifications. They suggest interesting even not statistically significant relations between 
variables under analysis. 
 
Interpretation of Results 
We compute the dependent variables used in the regressions based on indicators such as GDP, 
population size and stock market capitalization. As measures of financial sectors development 
we use stock market capitalization, financial system deposits and a dummy for financial crises. 
We use further measures of financial openness such as the ratio of remittances to GDP and the 
degree of financial openness which we compute as the ratio of exports and imports to GDP. To 
further characterize the economic development and the economic environment in the country we 
use GDP per capita, the real interest rate and the CPI measured inflation. To characterize the 
regulatory environment and the quality of governance in the country we use the regulatory 
quality index from “Governance Matters VII”, the corruption perception index from 
Transparency International, a dummy variable indicating the British origin of the legal system, 
and a dummy variable indicating the presence of a Lamfalussy type regulatory framework. We 
further use of variable for the mutual fund industry age. The human development index and 
ICRG’s political risk ratings are composite indices of social development and political 
environment. Finally, a series of variables derived from the World Values Survey denote the 
socio-cultural values prevalent in the countries analyzed. Such are indicators of trust in people, 
perceptions of the freedom of choice and degree of financial satisfaction, the relation between 
work and money or the importance money and material possessions should take in the future. In 
addition to that, we include variables measuring the percentage of Muslim, Christian Orthodox, 
Protestant, Roman Catholic and other religions believers. 
 In our first series of multivariate models we use net asset value to GDP (NAGDP) ratio 
as dependent variable. Models (4) and (6) are significant under all specifications reported (when 
dependent variables are per capita NAV or NAV growth rate) at least at the 15% level. This is 
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strong indication of the determination of NAV to GDP ratio by regulatory quality, industry age 
and a British legal system. All coefficients are positive and significant indicating a direct 
determination of mutual fund industry development by the three factors. Regulatory quality 
proves to be an excellent determinant of the industry development as it is significant in most 
model specifications. It replaces well all other indicators of regulatory and legal system quality 
used in previous analyses of mutual fund development capturing both the quality of laws and 
regulations and the effectiveness of their enforcement.10  
CPI and regulatory quality are highly correlated. The two indicators could be 
interchanged in multivariate OLS models. We use more often regulatory quality both because of 
the higher degree of determination for models in which it is present and for its informational 
content. 
 Model (3) is significant indicating that the presence of the Lamfalussy regulatory 
framework has a negative impact on mutual fund development. The finding is somehow 
surprising both given the assumed goals of the European Commission with the regulatory 
harmonization attempted at the EU level and because many of the countries in the common EU 
securities market are economies with developed financial systems. At the same time, this can 
suggest further measures to be taken towards the stimulation of mutual fund growth in EU 
countries. 
 Models (1), (13), (15), (22), (23) and (24) all suggest a positive influence of per capita 
GDP on mutual fund development. This is in accord with results of previous studies and 
indicates that economic development generates investment capitals that can further determine the 
development of the financial system. At the same time, there is a high correlation between 
regulatory quality and GDP per capita and the two indicators can be used alternatively in models 
for the determination if mutual fund development. 
 Other variables whose coefficients are significant in various models are stock market 
capitalization (model [2]), outflows of FDI (model [11]), degree of openness (models [5] and 
[16]). Models (15), (20), (23) and (24) indicate that mutual fund development is positively 
determined by an attitude which sees the decline of the role of money and material possessions in 
the future as a good thing. While this might appear counterintuitive, it might also mean that such 
attitudes are common among people in developed (post-materialist) societies that already have a 
high degree of economic development and, by consequence, a developed mutual fund industry. 
There is a positive, even if not very strong, correlation between GDP per capita and responses 
indexed by this variable (FUTMNY). While this aspect cannot be completely elucidated here, it 
indicated an issue that can be addressed in future research. 
 Although it does not have a significant coefficient in any of the models reported in our 
paper (models [7], [14], [25]), the sign of the relation between attitudes towards work and money 
and mutual fund development is always negative and we decided to report it. The variable codes 
for the answers of people agreeing that gaining money without work is a bad thing. The sign of 
the relation (minus) is logical and comes to confirm many ethnographic studies of money in 
postsocialist or postcolonial societies (Verdery, 1995b; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Mandel 
and Humphrey, 2002). It explains why the adoption of capitalist financial institutions and 
practices around the world is premised on the reconfiguration of attitudes towards money, the 
diminishing role of vulgar labor theories of values, and the view of investment and financial 
speculation as legitimate forms of gain. Further study of the relations between the ideologies of 
work and money and the adoption of capitalist practices is needed. 
                                               
10
 See description of indices in Kaufmann et all. (2008), “Government Matters VII”. 
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 At the same time, factors such as real interest rates and inflation are not significant 
coming to nuance some of the results of previous studies of mutual fund development around the 
world. Also, religion does not seem to play any role in explaining the size of the mutual fund 
industry. 
 Our second series of multivariate OLS models uses per capita NAV (NAPOP) as 
dependent variable. We use such specification of regression models as a robustness check for our 
main dependent variable. The variables with a significant influence on the development of 
mutual funds are the same: per capita GDP, regulatory quality, financial system deposits, 
outflows of FDI, degree of openness, and stock market capitalization. The variable coding for 
attitudes towards the future of money is also significant in several specifications of multivariate 
models. The variable coding for the presence of Lamfalussy regulations is again significant in a 
model in which it appears with regulatory quality and it has again a negative influence on mutual 
fund development. The variable coding for attitudes towards work and money is closer to being 
significant and again its coefficient is negative having the same significance as in the previous 
series of multivariate models. Finally, inflation, real interest rate or religion are still not 
significant under this class of specifications. 
 The final series of multivariate OLS models we report on use the average annual 
growth rate of mutual fund industry (NAGR) as dependent variable.  This series of 
specifications is not simply used for robustness. As the results are constantly opposed to those of 
the previous two series of models, this indicates that mutual fund development and growth are 
separate processes with different determinants.  
 Regulatory quality and GDP per capita are significant in several specifications each. In 
all significant specifications the coefficients of the two variables are negative indicating an 
negative relation between economic development and regulatory quality and the development of 
mutual funds. This means that, during the analyzed period, less developed countries had higher 
average annual growth rates of the industry. This is not surprising as they started from a much 
lower base but reflects an encouraging trend of growth for the worldwide mutual fund industry. 
 Model (7) shows that economic openness can be a significant factor and its influence is 
positive. Thus, this is one of the few factors considered whose influence is positive on both the 
development and growth of mutual funds. Model (8) shows a significant and negative influence 
of real interest rates. Combined with the significant and positive coefficient of inflation in model 
(9), this indicates the growth rates of mutual funds have been the highest in less stable economies 
with smaller real interest rates for the period and higher inflation. The emerging, postsocialist or 
postcolonial societies where the fund industry has been created recently is also where the growth 
of mutual funds has been the most accelerated (model [10]). 
  In the area of socio-cultural values we are able to report some interesting results. Model 
(11) shows that attitudes towards financial satisfaction, usually associated with economic and 
social development, exert a negative influence on the development of mutual funds.  The dummy 
variable on Lamfalussy type regulations is not significant under any specification and alternates 
signs so we can infer that this factor does not exert any real influence on our dependent variable.  
The variable coding for attitudes towards work and money is generally not significant 
with the exception of model (25) where its coefficient is significant. Furthermore, in all model 
specifications its coefficients are negative indicating that a widespread belief that gaining money 
without work is bad inhibits the growth of mutual funds in the respective countries. The variable 
coding for attitudes on the future role of money and material possessions is not significant in any 
of the specifications tried and its coefficient is usually positive. This, again, might indicate that 
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the variable does not stand for a factor with influence on mutual funds but codes for cultural 
attitudes towards money in societies where economic processes have or are occupying the center 
stage of social life.  
Models (18) to (23) report on the role of religious affiliation in the process analyzed. 
Thus, while the presence of large percentages of Muslims and Christian Orthodox believers in 
the country seems to exert a positive influence on the growth rates, the growth of mutual funds 
seems to be influenced adversely by the presence of larger proportions of Roman Catholic 
believers. Although it is hard to decide if religion does determine the growth of mutual funds, the 
good news for professionals in the industry is that it does not inhibit its development. As models 
we report on suggest, even Muslim and Christian Orthodox countries, for long periods of their 
history opposed to the adoption of capitalism, seem to join in the club of countries where the 
mutual fund industry is growing rapidly. 
 
Conclusions  
This paper analyzed the determinants of mutual fund development and growth during the period 
from 1996 to 2007 in a cross-country setting. We started with a sample of 44 countries from 
around the world for which we have comparable data on domestic mutual fund industries 
reported by the Investment Company Institute. We excluded from the database the cases of 
Ireland, Lichtenstein and Luxembourg for insufficient data or because the indicators 
characterizing the size of their industries represent outliers in the sample.  
 The paper is based on a comprehensive database of indicators characterizing economic 
and social development, the size and characteristics of the rest of the financial system, the quality 
of regulations, political and judicial environment, as well as numerous variables coding for the 
socio-cultural characteristics of the population in each country. We selected a reduced number of 
variables highly correlated with the indicators of mutual fund development and growth on which 
we ran a high number of multivariate regressions. Several model specifications with significant 
coefficients were reported for each of the dependent variables we used in our paper. The goals of 
the analysis were to evaluate some of the results of similar previous studies over a longer period 
of time, to identify new factors with a significant impact on the development and growth of 
mutual funds, and to formulate new hypotheses and themes of research. 
 The fist dependent variable was NAV to GDP ratio. The regression results confirmed the 
significant influence of regulatory quality, socio-economic development, financial development 
and degree of openness of the country (relative to trade and financial flows). At the same time, 
results also indicated the weak negative impact of a Lamfalussy type regulatory framework on 
mutual fund development. Indicators coding for various socio-cultural values also provided some 
interesting results. Thus, trust in people does not exert a significant influence on mutual fund 
development. Financial satisfaction seems to be positively related to the development of funds 
while a belief that money should play a less prominent role in the future is also positively related 
to mutual fund development. At the same time, the belief that money and legitimate gains should 
be based on work exerts a negative yet non-significant influence on the dependent variable. 
Combined with reports from ethnographic studies of the adoption of capitalist practices around 
the world, this suggests a potentially rewarding set of research questions. 
 While the second dependent variable on which we report the results of regressions (per 
capita NAV) confirms the robustness of results obtained for the first series of regressions, the 
third series of regressions performed for the average annual growth rate of national mutual fund 
industries provides some new results. These indicate that mutual funds have grown most rapidly 
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in less developed countries where inflation was higher and real interest rates were lower. Results 
also indicate that the mutual fund industry grew more rapidly in countries with a lower quality of 
regulations (although development and regulatory quality are positively related) and in countries 
with higher proportions of Muslim and Christian Orthodox believers. The Lamfalussy-type 
regulations in the field of securities do not exert a significant influence on fund growth while 
attitudes about work as the legitimate foundation of money are negatively related to the growth 
of the growth of mutual funds. The results of the last set of regressions should be interpreted with 
caution. Given the low starting point (the low level of mutual fund development) of the countries 
with the highest growth rates, the absolute increase proves less spectacular than the rates of 
growth of the mutual fund industry.  
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Annex 1: Description of dependent and explanatory variables wit the corresponding data sources.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Variable Significance Factor of development  Source of data 
NAGDP Net asset value of mutual fund industry 
as a ratio to GDP. Computed by the 
authors. Average for 1996-2007 
Dependent Variable Investment Company 
Institute, WDI-WB and IFS-
IMF.  
NAPOP Net asset value of domestic mutual fund 
industry per capita. Computed by the 
authors. Average for 1996-2007 
Dependent Variable Investment Company 
Institute and IFS-IMF. 
NASMK Net asset value of domestic mutual fund 
industry as a ratio to stock market 
capitalization. Computed by the authors. 
Average for 1996-2007. 
Dependent Variable Investment Company 
Institute and Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2008) 
NAGR Net asset value annual growth rate. 
Computed by the authors. Average for 
1996-2007 
Dependent Variable Investment Company 
Institute and European Fund 
and Asset Management 
Association 
 
EXPLANATORY AND AUXILIARY VARIABLES  
 
Variable Significance Factor of development  Source of data 
NAV The absolute size of the mutual fund 
industry in each country analyzed. 
Measured as net asset value in million 
USD. The average for the period 1996-
2007 is used in the multivariate 
regressions.  
 Investment Company 
Institute (ICI); European 
Fund and Asset Management 
Association; national 
associations of asset 
managers  
GDP The Gross Domestic Product measured in 
USD taken from the World Development 
Indicators Database of the World Bank 
and from the International Financial 
Statistics Database of the IMF. Measured 
in USD. Average for 1996-2007.  
 World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Database, 
the World Bank, and 
International Financial 
Statistics database, IMF 
POP Number of inhabitants in each country. 
Million inhabitants. Average for 1996-
2007.  
Population size  International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), IMF 
SMKC Stock market capitalization as a ratio to 
GDP. Average for 1996-2007 
Capital market development Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008  
DFC Dummy variable for financial crises. 1 if 
the country was affected by a systemic 
banking crisis, currency crisis, or debt 
crisis during the period from 1996 to 
2007; 0 if no crisis.  
Financial crises / 
Financial environment 
 
Laeven and Valencia, 
“Systemic Banking Crises: A 
New Database”, 2008 
CPI Corruption Perception Index published 
by Transparency International. CPI 
Score: 1 – very high corruption; 10 – no 
corruption. Average for 1996-2007 
Political corruption / 
Quality of government 
Transparency International 
VACC Voice and Accountability indicator 
measuring participation in the election of 
government, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media 
by citizens. Scale: -2.5 to 2.5; higher 
value means better outcome. Average for 
1996-2007 
Political environment  
 
Kaufmann et al., 
“Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-
2007”, 2008 
PSAV Political Stability and Absence of Political environment Kaufmann et al., 
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Violence measuring perceptions about 
the possibility that government will be 
overthrown or changed. Scale: -2.5 to 
2.5; higher value means better outcome. 
Average for 1996-2007 
“Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-
2007”, 2008 
GEFF Government Effectiveness measures the 
quality of public policies and of the civil 
service. Scale: -2.5 to 2.5; higher value 
means better outcome. Average for 1996-
2007 
Political environment Kaufmann et al., 
“Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-
2007”, 2008 
REGQ Regulatory Quality measures the ability 
of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector 
development. Scale: -2.5 to 2.5; higher 
value means better outcome. Average for 
1996-2007 
Regulatory quality Kaufmann et al., 
“Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-
2007”, 2008 
RLAW Rule of Law measures perceptions of the 
rules of society, the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. Scale: -2.5 to 2.5; 
higher value means better outcome. 
Average for 1996-2007 
Regulatory quality Kaufmann et al., 
“Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-
2007”, 2008 
CCOR Control of Corruption measures 
perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exerted for private gain; petty 
and grand forms of corruption; "capture" 
of the state by elites and private interests. 
Scale: -2.5 to 2.5; higher value means 
better outcome. Average for 1996-2007 
Political corruption / Quality 
of government 
Kaufmann et al., 
“Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-
2007”, 2008 
LIQLR Ratio of liquid liabilities in the economy 
to GDP. Average for 1996-2007 
Financial system 
development 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
BDEP Ratio of bank deposits in the economy to 
GDP. Average for 1996-2007 
Banking system development Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
FSDEP Ratio of financial system deposits in the 
economy to GDP. Average for 1996-
2007 
Financial system 
development 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
LIQL Amount of liquid liabilities in the 
economy. Measured in 2000 million 
USD. Average for 1996-2007 
Financial system 
development 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
BOHC Ratio of bank overhead costs to total 
assets. Average for 1996-2007 
Banking system development Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
LIPV Ratio of life insurance premiums in the 
economy to GDP. Average for 1996-
2007 
Financial system 
development 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
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NLIPV Ratio of non-life insurance premiums in 
the economy to GDP. Average for 1996-
2007 
Financial system 
development 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
SMTVT Ratio of stock market total value traded 
to GDP. Average for 1996-2007 
Capital market development Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
SMTOV Stock market turnover ratio. Average for 
1996-2007 
Capital market development Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
LISTC Number of listed companies on the local 
capital market. Average for 1996-2007 
Capital market development Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
PVBDK Ratio of private bond market 
capitalization to GDP. Average for 1996-
2007 
Financial system 
development 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
PBBDK Ratio of public bond market 
capitalization to GDP. Average for 1996-
2007 
Financial system 
development 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
INTDBT Ratio of international debt issues to GDP. 
Average for 1996-2007 
Degree of financial openness Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
LNRBKN Ratio of loans from non-resident banks 
(net) to GDP. Average for 1996-2007 
Degree of financial openness Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
LNRBKN Ratio of loans from non-resident banks 
(amount outstanding) to GDP. Average 
for 1996-2007 
Degree of financial openness Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
OFFBDK Ratio of offshore bank deposits to 
domestic bank deposits. Average for 
1996-2007 
Degree of financial openness Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
REMIT Ratio of remittance inflows to GDP.  
Average for 1996-2007 
Economic development Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000), “A New 
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure”; 
updated in November 2008 
STKTOV Ratio of total value of stocks traded to 
GDP. Average for 1996-2007 
Capital market development World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
INTUS Ratio of internet users per 100 people. 
Average for 1996-2007 
Social development World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
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GINIWB GINI index of social inequality. Average 
for  1996-2007 
Social development World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
GDPCAP Ratio of GDP per capita (ct. 2000 US$). 
Average for  1996-2007 
Economic development World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
DAYNWS Ratio of daily newspapers per 1,000 
people. Average for  1996-2007 
Social development World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
FDIINF Ratio of the net inflows of foreign direct 
investments to GDP. Average for  1996-
2007 
Degree of financial openness World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
FDIOUT Ratio of the net outflows of foreign direct 
investments to GDP. Average for  1996-
2007 
Degree of financial openness World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
EXPGDP Ratio of exports of goods and services to 
GDP. Average for  1996-2007 
Degree of financial openness World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
IMPGDP Ratio of imports of goods and services to 
GDP. Average for  1996-2007 
Degree of financial openness World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
OPNGDP Ratio of the total of exports and imports 
to GDP. Average for 1996-2007 
Degree of financial openness World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
RINTR Average real interest rates for the period 
1996-2007. Computed by the authors. 
Economic environment World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
INFCPI Average inflation measured from the 
consumer price index for the period 
1996-2007. Computed by the authors. 
Economic environment World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Indicators, 
the World Bank 
RGN Variable coding for the region of the 
world to which the country belongs: 1- 
Americas; 2 - Europe; 3 – Asia and the 
Pacific; 4 - Africa. 
Geography ICI Classification 
LLSV99 Variable coding for the legal origin of the 
countries under survey following 
LLSV99: 1 - French; 2 - German; 3 - 
Scandinavian; 4 - British. 
Legal system La Porta et al., “Law and 
Finance”, 1998 (LLSV99) 
STRTYR Start year for mutual fund industry in the 
countries in the database.  
Industry Age Khorana et al., “Explaining 
the size of the mutual fund 
industry around the world”, 
2005 
INDAGE Age of mutual fund industry in each 
country as of 2007. Computed by the 
authors. 
Industry Age Khorana et al., “Explaining 
the size of the mutual fund 
industry around the world”, 
2005 
BKCCTR Indicator of bank sector concentration 
measuring the fraction of assets held by 
the top three banks in the system.  
Banking system development Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
“Regulations, Market 
Structure, Institutions, and the 
Cost of Financial 
Intermediation”, 2004 
LEGUK Dummy variable indicting the British 
legal origin (1) of the country. 
Legal system La Porta et al., “Law and 
Finance”, 1998 
LEGFR Dummy variable indicting the French 
legal origin (1) of the country. 
Legal system La Porta et al., “Law and 
Finance”, 1998 
LEGGE Dummy variable indicting the German 
legal origin (1) of the country. 
Legal system La Porta et al., “Law and 
Finance”, 1998 
LEGSK Dummy variable indicting the 
Scandinavian legal origin (1) of the 
country. 
Legal system La Porta et al., “Law and 
Finance”, 1998 
DLSSY Lamfalussy Dummy indicating the Regulatory quality Lamfalussy League Table. 
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inclusion of the country in the group 
having adopted the EU regulatory 
framework regarding capital markets and 
mutual funds. Variable created by the 
authors 
Transposition of Lamfalussy 
Directives. 
PPTRUST Ratio of affirmative responses to question 
“A165.- Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people?” from the World 
Values Survey. Average results for 1994-
1999 and 1999-2004 waves of the survey 
 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
FRCHOIC Index measuring the freedom of choice 
perceived by respondents to the World 
Values Survey: 1 – no freedom at all; 10 
– a great deal of freedom. Average results 
for 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of 
the survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
FINSAT Index of satisfaction with the financial 
situation of the household: 1 – 
dissatisfied; 10 – satisfied. Average 
results for 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 
waves of the survey 
Economic development World Values Survey 
Databank 
WKMNY Ratio of respondents agreeing that it is 
humiliating to receive money without 
having to work for it. Average results for 
1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of the 
survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
FUTMNY Ratio of respondents agreeing that less 
emphasis on money and material 
possessions in the future is a good thing. 
Average results for 1994-1999 and 1999-
2004 waves of the survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
CONFJST Ratio of respondents having confidence 
in the justice system. Average results for 
1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of the 
survey 
Quality of government World Values Survey 
Databank 
CONFGOV Ratio of respondents having confidence 
in the government. Average results for 
1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of the 
survey 
Quality of government World Values Survey 
Databank 
HDI Human development Index. Average 
computed by the authors from series for 
years 1995, 2000, 2002 
Social development The UNDP Human 
Development Report 
ICRGPRR Political Risk Rating measured by the 
International Country Risk Group. Index 
defined on 12 variables covering political 
and social attributes of risk and stability. 
Based on a scale of 100 with high values 
being related to low risk. Average from 
the series for 1996, 2002, and 2007  
Political environment The PRS Group International 
Country Risk Guide 2009 
AVGSCH Average school years by the people in the 
countries under survey. Data was 
published in the year 2000 
Social development Barro and Lee, “International 
Data on Educational 
Attainment: 
Updates and Implications”, 
2000 
DEPINSE Dummy variable for the presence of 
deposit insurance schemes in the 
countries under survey: 1 – explicit; 0 – 
implicit. 
Banking system development Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
“Deposit Insurance Around 
the World: A Comprehensive 
Database”, 2005 
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DEPINSFC Dummy variable for the presence of 
foreign currency deposit insurance 
schemes in the countries under survey: 1 
– yes; 0 – no. 
Banking system development Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
“Deposit Insurance Around 
the World: A Comprehensive 
Database”, 2005 
DEPINSIB Dummy variable for the presence of 
inter-bank deposits insurance schemes in 
the countries under survey: 1 – yes; 0 – 
no. 
Banking system development Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
“Deposit Insurance Around 
the World: A Comprehensive 
Database”, 2005 
DEPCOINS Dummy variable for the presence of 
deposit insurance schemes based on 
coinsurance in the countries under 
survey: 1 – yes; 0 – no. 
Banking system development Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
“Deposit Insurance Around 
the World: A Comprehensive 
Database”, 2005 
DEPINSIV Dummy variable for the type of deposit 
insurance schemes in the countries under 
survey: 1 – payment per depositor; 0 – 
payment per deposit. 
Banking system development Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
“Deposit Insurance Around 
the World: A Comprehensive 
Database”, 2005 
DEPINSPR Dummy variable for the permanent 
funding of the deposit insurance schemes 
in the countries under survey: 1 – funded; 
0 – unfunded. 
Banking system development Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
“Deposit Insurance Around 
the World: A Comprehensive 
Database”, 2005 
MSLM Percentage of the population declaring 
themselves Muslim. Based on data from 
the 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of 
the survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
OTDX Percentage of the population declaring 
themselves Christian Orthodox. Based on 
data from the 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 
waves of the survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
PRST Percentage of the population declaring 
themselves Protestant. Based on data 
from the 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 
waves of the survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
RCAT Percentage of the population declaring 
themselves Roman Catholic. Based on 
data from the 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 
waves of the survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
OTHR Percentage of the population declaring 
themselves of other religion than the four 
mentioned above. Based on data from the 
1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of the 
survey 
Human socio-cultural values World Values Survey 
Databank 
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Annex 3: Pairwise correlation matrix for the dependent and explanatory variables 
 
  NAV NAGDP NAPOP NASMK NAGR GDP POP SMKC DFC CPI VACC 
NAV 1                     
NAGDP 0.354201 1                   
NAPOP 0.445183 0.961935 1                 
NASMK 0.115506 0.386968 0.28997 1               
NAGR -0.15307 -0.33204 -0.25624 -0.33121 1             
GDP 0.911381 0.237351 0.338131 0.025414 -0.21967 1           
POP 0.14433 -0.16017 -0.13337 -0.18955 0.055623 0.209692 1         
SMKC 0.185469 0.726893 0.761258 -0.12889 -0.24427 0.149277 -0.10875 1       
DFC 0.231612 -0.25354 -0.20496 -0.17683 0.249723 0.323911 0.208873 -0.20333 1     
CPI 0.146645 0.493425 0.527974 0.222585 -0.54179 0.137472 -0.34428 0.481549 -0.45305 1   
VACC 0.104399 0.280297 0.26523 0.335911 -0.69123 0.07067 -0.54711 0.186419 -0.464 0.790657 1 
PSAV 0.049561 0.327383 0.355317 0.351402 -0.55765 0.063526 -0.42075 0.246013 -0.37063 0.821625 0.848601 
GEFF 0.188531 0.485551 0.512196 0.292859 -0.61166 0.170476 -0.364 0.447529 -0.45101 0.965735 0.848874 
REGQ 0.174252 0.528808 0.54474 0.316588 -0.6305 0.133172 -0.45916 0.472256 -0.43786 0.927864 0.848558 
RLAW 0.177985 0.460615 0.490848 0.307228 -0.63312 0.182027 -0.34268 0.392147 -0.45128 0.954208 0.871759 
CCOR 0.160338 0.474907 0.501331 0.286955 -0.59581 0.148679 -0.36951 0.434817 -0.47143 0.988215 0.8496 
LIQLR 0.047095 0.541975 0.578106 0.056305 -0.38213 0.236153 -0.08329 0.650976 -0.08489 0.471012 0.261925 
BDEP 0.063154 0.561124 0.593446 0.062249 -0.4088 0.246227 -0.10193 0.67065 -0.09248 0.505511 0.291189 
FSDEP 0.057556 0.554861 0.588447 0.05327 -0.41312 0.236176 -0.10641 0.682789 -0.07946 0.499929 0.288534 
LIQL 0.562757 0.118333 0.20936 -0.05692 -0.22547 0.83822 0.158868 0.132712 0.322338 0.166592 0.112672 
BOHC -0.06991 -0.13385 -0.1402 -0.08072 0.372827 -0.14743 -0.22949 -0.1559 0.307215 -0.41631 -0.27868 
LIPV 0.091461 0.405798 0.370375 -0.00343 -0.38655 0.212508 -0.12867 0.619138 -0.13382 0.445801 0.34854 
NLIPV 0.346292 0.334274 0.337849 0.273887 -0.42397 0.329447 -0.30903 0.289978 -0.17112 0.677832 0.680047 
SMKC01 0.185469 0.726893 0.761258 -0.12889 -0.24427 0.149277 -0.10875 1 -0.20333 0.481549 0.186419 
SMTVT 0.371224 0.622297 0.687447 -0.08309 -0.27457 0.408984 0.021416 0.760968 -0.10405 0.420912 0.185798 
SMTOV 0.186837 0.056055 0.068625 -0.07863 0.029592 0.246587 0.304212 0.061785 0.008409 -0.04578 -0.21723 
LISTC 0.038273 -0.14366 -0.1494 -0.19994 0.066252 0.144989 0.50142 -0.10973 0.045257 -0.3285 -0.11974 
PVBDK 0.531383 0.300412 0.383527 0.263887 -0.44406 0.523421 -0.16822 0.116815 -0.08566 0.558015 0.490364 
PBBDK 0.115227 0.030516 -0.00448 0.138538 -0.36349 0.280976 -0.17533 -0.07434 -0.09611 0.149012 0.336418 
INTDBT 0.004037 0.31105 0.305663 0.223645 -0.44147 -0.02477 -0.31702 0.287972 -0.31038 0.566514 0.550718 
LNRBKN 0.103978 0.285229 0.239449 0.120497 -0.35886 0.080328 -0.16469 0.215911 -0.23068 0.401081 0.408858 
LNRBKA -0.02742 0.541892 0.60192 -0.01657 -0.24555 -0.06572 -0.22897 0.743693 -0.19552 0.492058 0.286827 
OFFBDK -0.0237 0.471625 0.547993 -0.08117 -0.18745 -0.05458 -0.16046 0.765616 -0.18642 0.396266 0.199997 
REMIT -0.13003 -0.24673 -0.23009 -0.19792 0.206681 -0.16963 0.094828 -0.21142 0.077983 -0.36454 -0.26932 
STKTOV 0.226769 0.064616 0.078885 -0.0491 0.039302 0.257899 0.247919 0.033233 0.068971 -0.00539 -0.20825 
INTUS 0.246025 0.455997 0.518037 0.254904 -0.47495 0.255148 -0.35019 0.386664 -0.25595 0.89007 0.747094 
GINIWB 0.08406 0.044657 -0.05567 -0.17263 -0.08441 0.087 0.154208 0.163427 0.193193 -0.36984 -0.40075 
GDPCAP 0.334424 0.531004 0.62508 0.205522 -0.49136 0.416501 -0.27211 0.503181 -0.24072 0.824919 0.643434 
DAYNWS 0.027402 0.161256 0.282709 0.028111 -0.33497 0.185346 -0.25001 0.306586 -0.13637 0.717046 0.546109 
FDIINF -0.10168 0.385807 0.407543 0.039166 -0.08545 -0.1903 -0.16719 0.403292 -0.20434 0.2305 0.146703 
FDIOUT -0.02863 0.550909 0.583284 0.058638 -0.23233 -0.08183 -0.21055 0.626952 -0.33814 0.487381 0.322236 
EXPGDP -0.19438 0.428619 0.479111 0.074426 0.010573 -0.29424 -0.25151 0.485116 -0.1925 0.226003 0.117716 
IMPGDP -0.17622 0.412715 0.451459 0.103112 0.007538 -0.28718 -0.262 0.435721 -0.17205 0.153087 0.105799 
OPNGDP -0.18634 0.422795 0.467725 0.088942 0.009126 -0.29215 -0.25788 0.463022 -0.18332 0.191069 0.112389 
RINTR -0.0078 0.069587 -0.05283 0.156933 -0.09893 -0.02711 0.051987 -0.05097 0.190624 -0.17207 -0.07446 
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INFCPI -0.11389 -0.35975 -0.33737 -0.24804 0.49495 -0.15969 -0.0351 -0.33941 0.391312 -0.51054 -0.44426 
RGN -0.23161 0.097396 0.056721 -0.13728 0.131951 -0.14703 0.253598 0.228069 -0.04351 -0.06615 -0.21808 
LLSV99 0.261286 0.370687 0.419286 -0.04831 0.007147 0.216637 0.159757 0.418462 -0.17641 0.408525 0.149218 
INDAGE 0.383021 0.417945 0.426163 0.114891 -0.48599 0.38606 -0.13239 0.438749 -0.15947 0.435371 0.354355 
BKCCTR -0.39402 -0.01578 -0.02561 -0.19208 0.04754 -0.5537 -0.38714 0.17831 -0.37582 0.265014 0.237452 
LEGUK 0.319649 0.431186 0.423051 -0.05945 0.04183 0.243094 0.174896 0.417398 -0.1081 0.183068 -0.01576 
LEGFR -0.12567 -0.15424 -0.23705 -0.03156 0.019424 -0.17403 -0.16387 -0.25003 0.099587 -0.372 -0.18346 
LEGGE -0.1056 -0.23267 -0.18629 0.140647 -0.02319 0.039789 0.103212 -0.15057 0.137675 -0.07689 -0.00121 
LEGSK -0.07737 -0.00202 0.075509 -0.07505 -0.05276 -0.1134 -0.12947 0.059667 -0.22404 0.474092 0.325461 
NEWSPP 0.018677 0.159637 0.276536 0.026066 -0.36963 0.17346 -0.25691 0.309746 -0.16883 0.731826 0.573973 
DLSSY -0.13493 -0.0509 -0.07379 0.288215 -0.08711 -0.17356 -0.30041 -0.20285 -0.21278 0.218412 0.458055 
PPTRUST 0.057943 0.219512 0.37005 -0.00825 -0.29958 0.12041 0.165858 0.30482 -0.3321 0.6629 0.362079 
FRCHOIC 0.2225 0.403812 0.409211 0.239135 -0.58134 0.146786 -0.1082 0.329307 -0.17461 0.55151 0.524712 
FINSAT 0.205228 0.497175 0.553478 0.185997 -0.76771 0.262045 0.003577 0.508324 -0.34843 0.717159 0.539693 
WKMNY -0.25779 -0.52851 -0.56061 -0.25515 0.373775 -0.29072 0.397787 -0.51847 0.323889 -0.81409 -0.75525 
FUTMNY 0.111655 0.365646 0.355155 0.181996 -0.07776 -0.04749 -0.35414 0.027181 -0.23798 0.249246 0.238796 
CONFJST -0.17719 -0.10381 -0.03741 -0.08679 -0.18606 -0.02909 0.283367 0.235027 -0.12611 0.249966 0.0675 
CONFGOV -0.08259 -0.14137 -0.14939 -0.1192 -0.17693 -0.10271 0.582159 0.196625 -0.06862 -0.16768 -0.34828 
HDI 0.175764 0.457721 0.47171 0.369308 -0.56514 0.192505 -0.51376 0.267755 -0.1731 0.746844 0.755406 
ICRGPRR 0.112759 0.370518 0.395029 0.309866 -0.62247 0.123415 -0.38333 0.313903 -0.37047 0.877774 0.870126 
AVGSCH 0.273187 0.308394 0.395044 0.038978 -0.19807 0.255038 -0.35713 0.309902 0.005712 0.612784 0.584311 
DEPINSE 0.055143 -0.25764 -0.21436 0.011228 -0.14191 0.113253 -0.20281 -0.23252 0.169876 0.012229 0.304559 
DEPINSFC 0.050022 -0.1817 -0.11031 0.021746 0.277627 -0.12562 0.001939 -0.36634 -0.16667 -0.06117 0.040783 
DEPINSIB 0.558161 0.295055 0.39637 -0.06798 -0.00432 0.474196 0.095474 0.185148 0.223607 0.042148 -0.01207 
DEPCOINS -0.1191 -0.17899 -0.16229 0.168216 0.262978 -0.11478 -0.12953 -0.15506 0.114885 -0.01452 0.000879 
DEPINSIV -0.30288 -0.30172 -0.28374 -0.2849 0.159937 -0.26355 -0.0236 -0.06216 -0.1707 0.037169 0.118338 
DEPINSPR 0.033852 -0.29821 -0.27485 -0.27911 0.164684 0.070712 0.160688 -0.3334 0.264581 -0.31637 -0.29367 
MSLM -0.06475 -0.21044 -0.179 -0.20454 0.435398 -0.07522 0.143977 -0.16674 0.119156 -0.35158 -0.56502 
OTDX -0.07712 -0.16929 -0.16701 -0.17844 0.434638 -0.09192 -0.05586 -0.14916 0.211192 -0.31286 -0.2187 
PRST 0.140138 0.127491 0.185319 -0.06461 -0.26396 0.108032 -0.08857 0.237348 -0.15362 0.687237 0.471203 
RCAT -0.0436 -0.05631 -0.13919 0.400681 -0.19586 -0.12882 -0.24895 -0.29689 -0.10968 -0.14504 0.197793 
OTHR 0.032145 0.271977 0.305176 -0.22492 -0.16137 0.249804 0.465755 0.427717 0.059037 0.009621 -0.17025 
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  PSAV GEFF REGQ RLAW CCOR LIQLR BDEP FSDEP LIQL BOHC LIPV 
NAV                       
NAGDP                       
NAPOP                       
NASMK                       
NAGR                       
GDP                       
POP                       
SMKC                       
DFC                       
CPI                       
VACC                       
PSAV 1                     
GEFF 0.853063 1                   
REGQ 0.867683 0.94848 1                 
RLAW 0.87786 0.977113 0.94149 1               
CCOR 0.858413 0.980264 0.945602 0.979555 1             
LIQLR 0.40724 0.456665 0.492805 0.48903 0.457716 1           
BDEP 0.42694 0.488663 0.522858 0.515143 0.490038 0.996193 1         
FSDEP 0.424866 0.489579 0.51593 0.514345 0.484005 0.992317 0.995507 1       
LIQL 0.155052 0.170058 0.127991 0.222455 0.169226 0.50188 0.501601 0.487186 1     
BOHC -0.35716 -0.47093 -0.39733 -0.49914 -0.42376 -0.43382 -0.43405 -0.4366 -0.23951 1   
LIPV 0.300108 0.488077 0.417041 0.44004 0.436018 0.476089 0.505089 0.525874 0.327163 -0.40941 1 
NLIPV 0.618467 0.748603 0.674608 0.711193 0.710315 0.327949 0.365041 0.379038 0.256092 -0.29218 0.481348 
SMKC01 0.246013 0.447529 0.472256 0.392147 0.434817 0.650976 0.67065 0.682789 0.132712 -0.1559 0.619138 
SMTVT 0.229145 0.44503 0.420278 0.404192 0.390533 0.55484 0.563088 0.595654 0.292907 -0.36782 0.665171 
SMTOV -0.23092 -0.00306 -0.09184 -0.00099 -0.06148 0.068379 0.05074 0.081856 0.150063 -0.47032 0.279898 
LISTC -0.24304 -0.35006 -0.35154 -0.14072 -0.27547 -0.09466 -0.16304 -0.14486 0.290917 -0.03615 -0.02402 
PVBDK 0.475657 0.597097 0.519711 0.57266 0.563977 0.13557 0.149449 0.161129 0.396925 -0.2223 0.292067 
PBBDK 0.240689 0.23314 0.192686 0.277212 0.22019 0.312402 0.311699 0.29365 0.476488 -0.29334 0.177997 
INTDBT 0.482349 0.627474 0.571901 0.572673 0.608532 0.323743 0.326109 0.326641 -0.06368 -0.14187 0.227373 
LNRBKN 0.317939 0.474242 0.452357 0.438624 0.445911 0.332213 0.331015 0.323782 0.016282 -0.28305 0.23702 
LNRBKA 0.389259 0.485777 0.529924 0.457456 0.484825 0.667234 0.666131 0.681487 -0.03296 -0.13061 0.375867 
OFFBDK 0.314856 0.398138 0.419125 0.368867 0.386606 0.629724 0.622048 0.654913 -0.02697 -0.0612 0.362146 
REMIT -0.43244 -0.37876 -0.3562 -0.37077 -0.37293 -0.14707 -0.16497 -0.15699 -0.16759 -0.02989 -0.29053 
STKTOV -0.22103 0.035504 -0.06425 0.031961 -0.01244 0.094177 0.077866 0.10692 0.159933 -0.43067 0.169259 
INTUS 0.801451 0.904571 0.84146 0.888891 0.884819 0.43547 0.463774 0.478122 0.266397 -0.43372 0.471454 
GINIWB -0.4803 -0.43883 -0.36612 -0.47808 -0.39518 -0.11656 -0.09023 -0.09731 0.03383 0.444557 0.015794 
GDPCAP 0.698452 0.843021 0.749669 0.833999 0.826992 0.596967 0.614319 0.616894 0.483115 -0.36644 0.531386 
DAYNWS 0.66493 0.706656 0.613372 0.718938 0.704339 0.478835 0.479659 0.488901 0.396408 -0.39221 0.435652 
FDIINF 0.28425 0.266854 0.343263 0.22282 0.234851 0.348704 0.347473 0.332503 -0.18956 -0.069 0.099285 
FDIOUT 0.39859 0.530825 0.523538 0.471586 0.490819 0.544145 0.546258 0.545442 -0.06659 -0.2201 0.384231 
EXPGDP 0.317427 0.236005 0.357744 0.206901 0.210953 0.433893 0.433665 0.428963 -0.24891 -0.0937 0.067536 
IMPGDP 0.284641 0.172295 0.326319 0.157499 0.149617 0.422673 0.418143 0.410739 -0.24975 -0.08885 0.017436 
OPNGDP 0.30274 0.205664 0.34392 0.183488 0.181666 0.430395 0.428044 0.421987 -0.2505 -0.09175 0.043118 
RINTR -0.11413 -0.22794 -0.16292 -0.22477 -0.17052 -0.10366 -0.09302 -0.09574 -0.06352 0.342575 -0.16921 
INFCPI -0.49761 -0.56762 -0.49703 -0.53383 -0.51797 -0.43141 -0.43918 -0.4429 -0.19073 0.621172 -0.42945 
RGN -0.20648 -0.08078 -0.14008 -0.0718 -0.10297 0.289715 0.274893 0.287057 0.032544 -0.45918 0.439556 
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LLSV99 0.091846 0.333471 0.275157 0.332974 0.350611 0.2226 0.253136 0.244959 0.144761 -0.33727 0.340386 
INDAGE 0.145512 0.450931 0.410938 0.403009 0.440637 0.391946 0.418282 0.428924 0.291697 -0.07975 0.317982 
BKCCTR 0.273569 0.218018 0.245728 0.1729 0.239939 0.016772 0.020656 0.020631 -0.4992 -0.04785 -0.03551 
LEGUK -0.16558 0.105702 0.099725 0.106404 0.136347 0.222817 0.253094 0.235567 0.12103 -0.15339 0.231663 
LEGFR -0.2908 -0.36172 -0.29187 -0.37661 -0.33715 -0.25443 -0.27052 -0.2825 -0.21534 0.444498 -0.34907 
LEGGE 0.238848 0.021946 0.015343 0.055781 -0.04652 0.18239 0.164751 0.197086 0.211338 -0.23315 0.09179 
LEGSK 0.342807 0.413552 0.317185 0.385172 0.435415 -0.15944 -0.15001 -0.15279 -0.11401 -0.15927 0.109946 
NEWSPP 0.697449 0.721197 0.629985 0.737781 0.722404 0.500964 0.50049 0.511583 0.385368 -0.42842 0.452538 
DLSSY 0.436345 0.316298 0.362262 0.329322 0.302815 -0.03995 -0.06022 -0.08261 -0.16484 -0.14911 -0.02974 
PPTRUST 0.501362 0.627866 0.50163 0.608299 0.616786 0.32547 0.334299 0.329348 0.158411 -0.51964 0.267179 
FRCHOIC 0.570391 0.553503 0.572714 0.500661 0.537205 0.088202 0.135783 0.146071 -0.00469 -0.11273 0.213884 
FINSAT 0.581015 0.729647 0.673687 0.696762 0.700823 0.505083 0.538109 0.552932 0.251201 -0.43233 0.323234 
WKMNY -0.78743 -0.85372 -0.81679 -0.79111 -0.8214 -0.48523 -0.50295 -0.48262 -0.31618 0.335825 -0.46013 
FUTMNY 0.187266 0.26721 0.303539 0.251657 0.274518 -0.15694 -0.15662 -0.16917 -0.21917 0.006336 -0.19869 
CONFJST -0.00138 0.164811 0.068939 0.205591 0.204689 0.272656 0.280583 0.299278 0.17708 -0.27124 0.335727 
CONFGOV -0.21245 -0.13993 -0.2081 -0.18111 -0.18237 -0.12427 -0.10128 -0.07926 -0.21689 -0.31887 0.208496 
HDI 0.870825 0.807133 0.827422 0.795525 0.778142 0.429747 0.45216 0.453744 0.234084 -0.18857 0.285612 
ICRGPRR 0.948588 0.920957 0.90705 0.915703 0.90588 0.402298 0.427152 0.429035 0.157898 -0.38492 0.40664 
AVGSCH 0.623535 0.645166 0.598909 0.611047 0.597251 0.228417 0.25554 0.267678 0.230633 -0.09837 0.291156 
DEPINSE 0.162962 0.128796 0.116502 0.131145 0.065377 -0.12823 -0.13863 -0.12646 0.131055 0.098288 -0.03557 
DEPINSFC -0.0847 -0.04486 0.023393 -0.04832 -0.01444 -0.48144 -0.50963 -0.5642 -0.32462 0.102303 -0.47232 
DEPINSIB -0.15793 0.036843 0.021917 0.002166 0.015944 0.033223 0.081289 0.079412 0.257382 -0.02571 -0.10064 
DEPCOINS 0.066881 0.03574 0.090683 0.021677 0.020118 -0.01136 -0.01959 -0.04015 -0.11634 0.060995 -0.09618 
DEPINSIV 0.135924 0.019081 0.052587 0.053202 0.032026 0.042137 0.001067 0.018776 -0.09226 -0.19553 -0.00361 
DEPINSPR -0.29886 -0.32738 -0.36864 -0.34139 -0.35233 -0.22418 -0.23195 -0.24106 0.058575 0.134011 -0.25436 
MSLM -0.59814 -0.41068 -0.43655 -0.39388 -0.38223 -0.17471 -0.18818 -0.18936 -0.09019 0.044967 -0.23897 
OTDX -0.20295 -0.33662 -0.30951 -0.31506 -0.31634 -0.16687 -0.19387 -0.19841 -0.07707 0.355523 -0.263 
PRST 0.443237 0.636864 0.531327 0.588565 0.647441 0.014386 0.050171 0.060661 0.01367 -0.23926 0.348674 
RCAT 0.147951 -0.03313 0.043091 -0.04627 -0.06112 -0.15807 -0.15754 -0.16164 -0.18819 0.195415 -0.30257 
OTHR -0.06017 -0.02816 -0.03542 0.010824 -0.04317 0.56428 0.557971 0.558001 0.466893 -0.39319 0.499539 
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  NLIPV SMKC01 SMTVT SMTOV LISTC PVBDK PBBDK INTDBT LNRBKN LNRBKA OFFBDK 
NAV                       
NAGDP                       
NAPOP                       
NASMK                       
NAGR                       
GDP                       
POP                       
SMKC                       
DFC                       
CPI                       
VACC                       
PSAV                       
GEFF                       
REGQ                       
RLAW                       
CCOR                       
LIQLR                       
BDEP                       
FSDEP                       
LIQL                       
BOHC                       
LIPV                       
NLIPV 1                     
SMKC01 0.289978 1                   
SMTVT 0.41178 0.760968 1                 
SMTOV 0.046365 0.061785 0.566366 1               
LISTC -0.34481 -0.10973 0.060438 0.16373 1             
PVBDK 0.596167 0.116815 0.320414 0.234158 -0.07084 1           
PBBDK 0.186832 -0.07434 -0.06885 -0.02339 -0.09217 0.275686 1         
INTDBT 0.530527 0.287972 0.247405 -0.07057 -0.36074 0.235241 0.265161 1       
LNRBKN 0.549619 0.215911 0.290629 0.131972 -0.13228 0.230671 0.24665 0.747549 1     
LNRBKA 0.385597 0.743693 0.507961 -0.07911 -0.29997 0.127076 0.001092 0.542825 0.49593 1   
OFFBDK 0.343384 0.765616 0.573399 -0.02893 -0.34466 0.093059 -0.06271 0.445588 0.35418 0.938436 1 
REMIT -0.34876 -0.21142 -0.25771 -0.07676 0.065111 -0.28351 -0.02736 -0.07154 -0.07738 -0.11843 -0.10621 
STKTOV 0.065813 0.033233 0.478917 0.989545 0.126993 0.316822 0.060896 0.045427 0.228644 -0.01502 0.004159 
INTUS 0.721521 0.386664 0.543853 0.136637 -0.24729 0.680287 0.199081 0.535456 0.342942 0.413732 0.340804 
GINIWB -0.25605 0.163427 -0.09828 -0.2959 -0.17813 -0.36109 -0.19489 -0.26022 -0.16524 -0.08173 -0.03456 
GDPCAP 0.619677 0.503181 0.606505 0.109302 -0.38094 0.651595 0.351504 0.55017 0.37364 0.512413 0.459543 
DAYNWS 0.378313 0.306586 0.438307 0.142769 -0.27128 0.367355 0.237725 0.389517 0.126941 0.355769 0.331623 
FDIINF 0.078996 0.403292 0.135771 -0.25979 -0.14365 0.012822 0.093816 0.353277 0.232524 0.597862 0.488534 
FDIOUT 0.338934 0.626952 0.477098 -0.05425 -0.30403 0.194278 0.203518 0.640589 0.498546 0.808852 0.712791 
EXPGDP 0.013103 0.485116 0.212627 -0.23404 -0.26091 -0.0302 -0.1451 0.197379 0.085089 0.605846 0.520929 
IMPGDP -0.02701 0.435721 0.167736 -0.24736 -0.19707 -0.07146 -0.10902 0.154987 0.083769 0.577932 0.487584 
OPNGDP -0.00664 0.463022 0.191468 -0.24172 -0.23038 -0.05051 -0.12794 0.177381 0.08484 0.59493 0.50693 
RINTR -0.10805 -0.05097 -0.19675 -0.26046 -0.04848 -0.13588 0.008467 -0.15459 -0.1992 -0.09213 -0.07198 
INFCPI -0.39309 -0.33941 -0.33586 -0.10011 0.233789 -0.33308 -0.20892 -0.35431 -0.24863 -0.26937 -0.23909 
RGN -0.07404 0.228069 0.219074 0.347774 0.256644 -0.13784 -0.07139 -0.21409 -0.10829 0.025706 0.044138 
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LLSV99 0.233823 0.418462 0.35773 0.251185 0.337246 0.203329 -0.17949 -0.12155 -0.17072 0.137708 0.110626 
INDAGE 0.522811 0.438749 0.412026 0.087 -0.00433 0.446888 0.307636 0.573124 0.445801 0.415926 0.401071 
BKCCTR 0.001485 0.17831 -0.09582 -0.29884 -0.05158 -0.12095 -0.06084 0.244217 0.174624 0.338431 0.295566 
LEGUK 0.195496 0.417398 0.274644 0.160833 0.408289 0.015133 -0.12408 -0.11858 -0.02128 0.152705 0.112801 
LEGFR -0.25251 -0.25003 -0.33455 -0.30191 -0.10694 -0.24094 0.20657 0.176198 0.307036 -0.0569 -0.10273 
LEGGE 0.123418 -0.15057 0.055575 0.153567 -0.18422 0.013962 -0.09137 -0.17593 -0.24265 -0.09001 0.040985 
LEGSK -0.04684 0.059667 0.081663 0.036504  NA 0.322716 -0.01778 0.145518 -0.103 0.018541 -0.05131 
NEWSPP 0.401565 0.309746 0.450439 0.15184 -0.28392 0.377409 0.26246 0.436923 0.214046 0.402225 0.362451 
DLSSY 0.195125 -0.20285 -0.16586 -0.13805 -0.03405 0.203515 0.353712 0.443418 0.400185 0.134873 -0.00318 
PPTRUST 0.307277 0.30482 0.394437 0.261255 0.279731 0.489177 0.052951 0.286648 0.160705 0.215986 0.177391 
FRCHOIC 0.429339 0.329307 0.240743 -0.2701 -0.1233 0.281413 -0.12182 0.298666 0.040386 0.17029 0.145868 
FINSAT 0.479952 0.508324 0.486932 0.073173 -0.11788 0.473187 0.223581 0.544742 0.337193 0.472512 0.3993 
WKMNY -0.71843 -0.51847 -0.47662 0.0004 0.382267 -0.56942 -0.34767 -0.57829 -0.47927 -0.53362 -0.54466 
FUTMNY 0.100837 0.027181 0.18647 0.154141 -0.14397 0.24114 0.244998 0.294624 0.29665 0.251243 0.219094 
CONFJST -0.12933 0.235027 0.237937 0.236458 0.397122 0.109176 0.028879 -0.08027 -0.23388 0.046263 0.107933 
CONFGOV -0.28293 0.196625 0.216549 0.234898 -0.00237 -0.3432 -0.21467 -0.28041 -0.1063 0.027074 0.087033 
HDI 0.661974 0.267755 0.310272 -0.21587 -0.43296 0.532686 0.288362 0.556554 0.440018 0.40855 0.305261 
ICRGPRR 0.67928 0.313903 0.309704 -0.1644 -0.24616 0.55505 0.215698 0.578911 0.391186 0.394695 0.318874 
AVGSCH 0.536123 0.309902 0.290605 -0.18486 -0.10623 0.522832 -0.00183 0.265749 0.068945 0.194633 0.175939 
DEPINSE 0.116009 -0.23252 -0.01844 -0.03397 0.016858 0.169403 0.275163 0.269508 0.214127 -0.04143 -0.0572 
DEPINSFC -0.21989 -0.36634 -0.43357 -0.34487 0.040867 -0.05632 -0.12632 0.187015 0.186254 -0.04337 -0.22027 
DEPINSIB 0.147462 0.185148 0.142366 -0.03097 -0.1049 0.160369 0.086459 -0.02432 -0.04449 -0.14053 -0.11381 
DEPCOINS 0.126254 -0.15506 -0.29182 -0.32324 -0.22132 -0.04838 -0.17279 0.042751 0.028892 0.126528 0.060678 
DEPINSIV -0.16643 -0.06216 -0.12488 -0.07433 0.169497 -0.02049 -0.09357 -0.07341 0.128924 0.109202 0.079903 
DEPINSPR -0.43715 -0.3334 -0.13887 0.11374 0.158735 -0.08304 -0.04364 -0.32211 -0.34962 -0.49699 -0.46281 
MSLM -0.35404 -0.16674 -0.06289 0.480233 -0.02828 -0.24219 -0.07115 -0.26809 -0.17518 -0.16072 -0.12136 
OTDX -0.25739 -0.14916 -0.19784 -0.21463 0.239608 -0.1851 0.088019 -0.14857 -0.1007 -0.14778 -0.1135 
PRST 0.443565 0.237348 0.255904 0.082353 -0.06967 0.452915 -0.12952 0.232166 0.059626 0.162207 0.114359 
RCAT 0.111462 -0.29689 -0.38728 -0.41548 -0.4492 -0.1266 0.11658 0.217877 0.233069 -0.02747 -0.04671 
OTHR -0.13817 0.427717 0.518866 0.352575 0.467613 -0.04793 -0.02557 -0.23443 -0.18027 0.099794 0.121888 
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 REMIT STKTOV INTUS GINIWB GDPCAP DAYNWS FDIINF FDIOUT EXPGDP IMPGDP OPNGDP 
NAV            
NAGDP            
NAPOP            
NASMK            
NAGR            
GDP            
POP            
SMKC            
DFC            
CPI            
VACC            
PSAV            
GEFF            
REGQ            
RLAW            
CCOR            
LIQLR            
BDEP            
FSDEP            
LIQL            
BOHC            
LIPV            
NLIPV            
SMKC01            
SMTVT            
SMTOV            
LISTC            
PVBDK            
PBBDK            
INTDBT            
LNRBKN            
LNRBKA            
OFFBDK            
REMIT 1           
STKTOV -0.1012 1          
INTUS -0.40493 0.17379 1         
GINIWB 0.14021 -0.32211 -0.54367 1        
GDPCAP -0.36345 0.13955 0.87003 -0.41485 1       
DAYNWS -0.31655 0.16739 0.79652 -0.60574 0.84134 1      
FDIINF -0.08374 -0.20932 0.17336 -0.08762 0.16184 0.04438 1     
FDIOUT -0.13237 -0.00932 0.4342 -0.18518 0.51031 0.3302 0.85491 1    
EXPGDP -0.02626 -0.19806 0.21662 -0.2128 0.15935 0.15382 0.78296 0.67893 1   
IMPGDP 0.0362 -0.21049 0.13805 -0.20145 0.07798 0.06094 0.76587 0.62456 0.9812 1  
OPNGDP 0.00446 -0.20513 0.17885 -0.20826 0.11993 0.10844 0.77823 0.6553 0.99545 0.99513 1 
RINTR -0.05551 -0.24526 -0.17196 0.4792 -0.21668 -0.27107 0.01542 -0.11144 -0.07692 -0.06954 -0.07364 
INFCPI 0.08618 -0.06341 -0.49717 0.1623 -0.49501 -0.43401 -0.15268 -0.30628 -0.15522 -0.11413 -0.13566 
RGN 0.22544 0.28229 -0.06066 -0.10689 -0.07298 0.04437 -0.05341 0.00222 0.10838 0.11272 0.11103 
 42 
LLSV99 -0.14533 0.25169 0.39062 -0.19414 0.31135 0.2486 -0.02204 0.05007 0.06669 0.03917 0.05342 
INDAGE 0.0242 0.17755 0.43387 0.16729 0.48995 0.1583 0.13007 0.38523 -0.03757 -0.05763 -0.04764 
BKCCTR -0.02569 -0.2043 0.12308 -0.22623 -0.02653 0.08128 0.36443 0.32945 0.36451 0.38467 0.37606 
LEGUK 0.00469 0.17752 0.11074 0.16405 0.0834 -0.13732 -0.00198 0.03327 -0.01271 0.00474 -0.00416 
LEGFR 0.25631 -0.26549 -0.45653 0.47418 -0.33515 -0.46626 0.04583 0.01497 -0.14656 -0.10881 -0.12861 
LEGGE -0.18468 0.08701 0.07859 -0.38657 -0.00495 0.22036 -0.04448 -0.13335 0.1344 0.14025 0.13792 
LEGSK -0.14788 0.05695 0.4744 -0.41437 0.43859 0.60281 -0.00587 0.12772 0.05698 -0.03765 0.01053 
NEWSPP -0.29774 0.17513 0.79825 -0.60929 0.84648 0.99828 0.04057 0.34609 0.14146 0.05571 0.09947 
DLSSY -0.15455 -0.0377 0.20553 -0.62732 0.13212 0.17293 0.22645 0.24375 0.17911 0.23063 0.2054 
PPTRUST -0.32005 0.25844 0.70328 -0.52607 0.65799 0.70689 0.0836 0.31726 0.15423 -0.01551 0.07123 
FRCHOIC -0.12673 -0.35054 0.52307 0.04959 0.40989 0.26311 0.06332 0.12671 0.07639 0.03274 0.05545 
FINSAT -0.03916 0.03901 0.6753 -0.05988 0.7106 0.5628 -0.02997 0.52188 -0.03672 -0.12652 -0.08305 
WKMNY 0.40638 -0.07725 -0.75895 0.43531 -0.75631 -0.68582 -0.33145 -0.54012 -0.3054 -0.25082 -0.28111 
FUTMNY -0.1199 0.19116 0.24387 -0.22771 0.24062 0.0205 0.12154 0.25545 -0.06648 -0.01098 -0.03941 
CONFJST 0.1496 0.17343 0.1836 -0.10436 0.28787 0.52379 -0.24599 0.00097 -0.1086 -0.19723 -0.15393 
CONFGOV 0.14107 0.11783 -0.29311 0.27228 -0.16392 -0.09768 0.03126 0.04867 0.05354 -0.00157 0.02592 
HDI -0.43177 -0.16256 0.79686 -0.36714 0.7463 0.61064 0.24942 0.42396 0.2686 0.23289 0.25218 
ICRGPRR -0.39127 -0.14554 0.86495 -0.45264 0.7589 0.69171 0.26351 0.432 0.25019 0.19736 0.22529 
AVGSCH -0.33161 -0.16707 0.73234 -0.41496 0.61783 0.59982 0.13192 0.23395 0.21897 0.14962 0.18577 
DEPINSE -0.01288 -0.06349 0.13378 -0.3151 0.18679 0.26273 -0.07982 0.04072 -0.13793 -0.14437 -0.14176 
DEPINSFC 0.15772 -0.18971 -0.24717 -0.17516 -0.22064 -0.22443 0.18311 0.02805 0.19446 0.26014 0.22913 
DEPINSIB 0.59493 -0.00329 0.08529 0.16995 0.09677 -0.14898 -0.14047 -0.11272 -0.07801 -0.05149 -0.06562 
DEPCOINS -0.13529 -0.24749 -0.07412 -0.09095 -0.14973 -0.10511 0.38674 0.15438 0.3345 0.31646 0.32936 
DEPINSIV 0.08528 0.06303 0.00416 -0.36023 -0.06231 0.17462 -0.22027 -0.15856 0.13244 0.1516 0.14356 
DEPINSPR 0.17276 0.07687 -0.19481 -0.03259 -0.23293 -0.09795 -0.03519 -0.24711 -0.11665 -0.06981 -0.09457 
MSLM 0.15477 0.543 -0.34956 0.04407 -0.29858 -0.23385 -0.17045 -0.18288 -0.20294 -0.18717 -0.19611 
OTDX -0.0112 -0.21741 -0.2948 -0.03928 -0.22676 -0.19216 -0.1321 -0.1671 -0.12677 -0.08547 -0.10698 
PRST -0.26794 0.15415 0.68095 -0.34538 0.54427 0.58602 -0.09416 0.08455 -0.04974 -0.13525 -0.0922 
RCAT 0.15497 -0.36009 -0.18192 0.18235 -0.21262 -0.39591 0.17883 0.0404 0.08891 0.13748 0.11331 
OTHR -0.0486 0.14992 0.06606 0.14097 0.17105 0.22844 0.08537 0.14436 0.19183 0.161 0.17752 
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  RINTR INFCPI RGN LLSV99 INDAGE BKCCTR LEGUK LEGFR LEGGE LEGSK NEWSPP 
NAV                       
NAGDP                       
NAPOP                       
NASMK                       
NAGR                       
GDP                       
POP                       
SMKC                       
DFC                       
CPI                       
VACC                       
PSAV                       
GEFF                       
REGQ                       
RLAW                       
CCOR                       
LIQLR                       
BDEP                       
FSDEP                       
LIQL                       
BOHC                       
LIPV                       
NLIPV                       
SMKC01                       
SMTVT                       
SMTOV                       
LISTC                       
PVBDK                       
PBBDK                       
INTDBT                       
LNRBKN                       
LNRBKA                       
OFFBDK                       
REMIT                       
STKTOV                       
INTUS                       
GINIWB                       
GDPCAP                       
DAYNWS                       
FDIINF                       
FDIOUT                       
EXPGDP                       
IMPGDP                       
OPNGDP                       
RINTR 1                     
INFCPI -0.03826 1                   
 44 
RGN -0.23266 -0.13856 1                 
LLSV99 -0.09515 -0.32499 0.395769 1               
INDAGE 0.088935 -0.37857 -0.22201 0.24149 1             
BKCCTR -0.12986 0.10664 0.080314 0.060043 -0.16556 1           
LEGUK 0.004304 -0.15752 0.326077 0.847824 0.408228 -0.01611 1         
LEGFR 0.161582 0.403495 -0.42195 -0.79092 0.04017 0.018046 -0.42426 1       
LEGGE -0.10009 -0.18029 0.192815 -0.08119 -0.33461 -0.21568 -0.34114 -0.51461 1     
LEGSK -0.11817 -0.16714 -0.05686 0.242071 -0.13503 0.302532 -0.17437 -0.26304 -0.21151 1   
NEWSPP -0.29674 -0.4523 0.039894 0.216979 0.148989 0.15054 -0.16472 -0.44017 0.209649 0.600916 1 
DLSSY -0.19456 -0.09669 -0.16071 -0.24384 -0.11872 0.296287 -0.37468 0.058694 0.154694 0.188964 0.211505 
PPTRUST -0.33092 -0.44656 0.127762 0.424834 0.183681 0.171157 0.077628 -0.46471 0.001644 0.639374 0.703617 
FRCHOIC 0.186742 -0.52521 -0.28534 0.196659 0.348774 0.090587 0.065427 -0.19943 -0.00651 0.242624 0.258153 
FINSAT -0.03199 -0.60778 -0.15873 0.243471 0.553561 -0.03251 0.070831 -0.2693 0.006727 0.3007 0.57047 
WKMNY 0.175364 0.530725 0.228514 -0.25988 -0.4873 -0.24399 -0.08679 0.249774 0.007209 -0.32353 -0.68858 
FUTMNY -0.20901 0.046946 -0.5263 -0.16302 0.22931 0.171491 -0.09413 0.361589 -0.46146 0.242344 0.024845 
CONFJST -0.03369 -0.07134 0.403197 0.292561 0.061295 -0.05592 0.009533 -0.37412 0.092374 0.443548 0.518937 
CONFGOV 0.016285 -0.15117 0.251948 0.005953 -0.19776 -0.03153 -0.08473 -0.11885 0.137787 0.079673 -0.08314 
HDI -0.12264 -0.36798 -0.31589 -0.07451 0.283498 0.058555 -0.21239 -0.05755 0.122434 0.235292 0.62197 
ICRGPRR -0.17476 -0.55702 -0.14487 0.17387 0.276305 0.231321 -0.07972 -0.31348 0.15657 0.386484 0.717534 
AVGSCH -0.22714 -0.25778 -0.05691 0.299411 0.180875 0.045607 0.068542 -0.3867 0.128503 0.343061 0.57903 
DEPINSE -0.06883 0.07941 -0.47303 -0.44587 0.040691 -0.25828 -0.54238 0.230112 0.149414 0.14919 0.287817 
DEPINSFC -0.32026 0.186287 -0.16105 -0.10574 -0.21555 0.244516 -0.06565 0.245681 -0.33333 0.175075 -0.22927 
DEPINSIB -0.02394 -0.08176 -0.16621 0.331015 0.426908 -0.27514 0.528498 -0.05817 -0.22361 -0.11744 -0.16515 
DEPCOINS -0.04144 -0.02638 -0.0863 -0.01358 -0.08395 -0.05208 -0.01217 -0.13032 0.297582 -0.21909 -0.15288 
DEPINSIV -0.26235 -0.10822 0.337475 -0.04842 -0.28879 0.281365 -0.22787 -0.06572 0.087184 0.202548 0.205042 
DEPINSPR 0.110309 0.216021 0.093344 0.088776 -0.30551 0.028496 -0.01266 -0.06572 -0.06103 0.202548 -0.09601 
MSLM -0.17112 0.505361 0.18133 0.087793 -0.12086 0.01096 0.173419 0.030273 -0.13088 -0.09099 -0.24047 
OTDX -0.04826 0.462985 -0.0576 -0.28688 -0.27161 0.129939 -0.15822 0.355321 -0.17474 -0.0955 -0.20382 
PRST -0.1084 -0.30247 0.110819 0.589472 0.202973 0.235484 0.264972 -0.5453 -0.09191 0.667772 0.575671 
RCAT 0.226253 -0.15461 -0.47792 -0.52605 0.070639 -0.07723 -0.36133 0.408964 0.134967 -0.37525 -0.37214 
OTHR -0.04398 -0.25551 0.503504 0.313843 0.01098 -0.28809 0.24026 -0.35245 0.174503 -0.02332 0.21253 
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 DLSSY PPTRUST FRCHOIC FINSAT WKMNY FUTMNY CONFJST CONFGOV HDI ICRGPRR AVGSCH 
NAV            
NAGDP            
NAPOP            
NASMK            
NAGR            
GDP            
POP            
SMKC            
DFC            
CPI            
VACC            
PSAV            
GEFF            
REGQ            
RLAW            
CCOR            
LIQLR            
BDEP            
FSDEP            
LIQL            
BOHC            
LIPV            
NLIPV            
SMKC01            
SMTVT            
SMTOV            
LISTC            
PVBDK            
PBBDK            
INTDBT            
LNRBKN            
LNRBKA            
OFFBDK            
REMIT            
STKTOV            
INTUS            
GINIWB            
GDPCAP            
DAYNWS            
FDIINF            
FDIOUT            
EXPGDP            
IMPGDP            
OPNGDP            
RINTR            
INFCPI            
RGN            
 46 
LLSV99            
INDAGE            
BKCCTR            
LEGUK            
LEGFR            
LEGGE            
LEGSK            
NEWSPP            
DLSSY 1           
PPTRUST 0.03698 1          
FRCHOIC -
0.02907 
0.32348 1         
FINSAT -
0.22172 
0.60175 0.73615 1        
WKMNY -
0.50137 
-0.51656 -0.43903 -
0.40434 
1       
FUTMNY 0.36852 0.06639 0.0785 0.12464 -0.20651 1      
CONFJST -
0.23174 
0.38987 -0.02353 0.29802 0.06734 -0.32347 1     
CONFGOV -0.3141 0.13373 -0.01407 0.11301 0.41339 -0.28202 0.51793 1    
HDI 0.37527 0.37906 0.5435 0.55913 -0.7247 0.33599 -0.1699 -0.3656 1   
ICRGPRR 0.38715 0.57774 0.62895 0.65971 -0.83195 0.14413 0.05348 -0.21413 0.87887 1  
AVGSCH 0.10913 0.4788 0.49797 0.35471 -0.5926 -0.00457 -0.00806 -0.36443 0.70315 0.71508 1 
DEPINSE 0.42167 -0.11544 0.05954 0.08399 -0.15823 0.25816 0.05273 -0.15895 0.30994 0.18412 0.18742 
DEPINSFC 0.54917 -0.03007 -0.18863 -
0.37467 
0.02227 0.29913 -0.35082 -0.20038 -
0.13689 
-0.06647 -0.11453 
DEPINSIB -
0.36839 
-0.08098 0.28216 0.28481 0.02448 -0.03626 -0.00621 0.05194 -
0.02667 
-0.04921 0.27799 
DEPCOINS 0.26458 -0.15467 -0.14337 -
0.44112 
-0.11146 -0.20404 -0.29543 -0.24604 0.04549 0.1029 0.16156 
DEPINSIV 0.34501 0.17725 -0.17331 -
0.08606 
-0.09436 -0.16115 0.07061 -0.13616 -
0.01309 
0.10707 0.08692 
DEPINSPR -
0.21357 
-0.05176 -0.08729 -
0.20948 
0.18751 -0.17133 0.07399 -0.22715 -
0.30365 
-0.2445 0.05865 
MSLM -
0.25282 
-0.17302 -0.68121 -
0.35912 
0.50214 0.17119 0.12677 0.11823 -
0.56327 
-0.6183 -0.54747 
OTDX 0.11123 -0.21054 -0.18813 -
0.55794 
0.14719 0.10705 -0.194 -0.30157 -
0.06844 
-0.24615 0.11211 
PRST 0.02673 0.67809 0.47511 0.52104 -0.52408 0.01844 0.33895 -0.01267 0.3402 0.56579 0.57853 
RCAT 0.30893 -0.46085 0.12285 0.02527 -0.02092 0.10899 -0.50956 -0.1187 0.1862 0.08082 -0.21303 
OTHR -
0.38386 
0.27987 0.0137 0.20201 0.10916 -0.52732 0.4922 0.32421 -
0.14373 
-0.03569 0.01132 
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 DEPINSE DEPINSFC DEPINSIB DEPCOINS DEPINSIV DEPINSPR MSLM OTDX PRST RCAT OTHR 
NAV            
NAGDP            
NAPOP            
NASMK            
NAGR            
GDP            
POP            
SMKC            
DFC            
CPI            
VACC            
PSAV            
GEFF            
REGQ            
RLAW            
CCOR            
LIQLR            
BDEP            
FSDEP            
LIQL            
BOHC            
LIPV            
NLIPV            
SMKC01            
SMTVT            
SMTOV            
LISTC            
PVBDK            
PBBDK            
INTDBT            
LNRBKN            
LNRBKA            
OFFBDK            
REMIT            
STKTOV            
INTUS            
GINIWB            
GDPCAP            
DAYNWS            
FDIINF            
FDIOUT            
EXPGDP            
IMPGDP            
OPNGDP            
RINTR            
INFCPI            
RGN            
 48 
LLSV99            
INDAGE            
BKCCTR            
LEGUK            
LEGFR            
LEGGE            
LEGSK            
NEWSPP            
DLSSY            
PPTRUST            
FRCHOIC            
FINSAT            
WKMNY            
FUTMNY            
CONFJST            
CONFGOV            
HDI            
ICRGPRR            
AVGSCH            
DEPINSE 1           
DEPINSFC  NA 1          
DEPINSIB  NA -0.12423 1         
DEPCOINS  NA 0.26667 -0.17889 1        
DEPINSIV  NA 0.28333 -0.31305 0.01849 1       
DEPINSPR  NA -0.08333 0.17889 -0.13868 -0.14423 1      
MSLM -0.25021 0.09497 -0.04689 -0.09907 -0.29869 0.10467 1     
OTDX 0.13612 0.09689 -0.08882 0.04157 0.1724 0.16947 -
0.06327 
1    
PRST -0.11234 0.02339 0.07238 -0.07564 0.16789 0.03847 -
0.17545 
-
0.22204 
1   
RCAT 0.24386 0.2003 0.03302 0.22847 -0.07906 -0.29786 -
0.30228 
-0.3071 -
0.45727 
1  
OTHR -0.1358 -0.48105 -0.02602 -0.24948 -0.04998 0.18197 -
0.09253 
-
0.14656 
-
0.08539 
-
0.46809 
1 
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